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The present thesis is an attempt to understand the relation between concepts of 
organized being and life in Kant's philosophy and the status of these concepts in his 
philosophical system. The main theme of this thesis is the mechanical inexplicability 
of organized beings due to the peculiar purposiveness of their organization and their 
relation to the principle of life as the immaterial principle of spontaneous action. 
Kant's early interest in the concepts in question is manifested in pre-Critical works 
mainly as the mind-body problem. The first Critique elevates the mind-body problem 
to the problems of unity of reason and nature, teleology, systematicity and freedom. 
The third Critique, by introducing the reflecting power of judgment and internal 
purposiveness, offers a solution to the problem of system and freedom by positing the 
organized/living being as the mediator between metaphysics and physics and 
establishes a discourse which could be called a metaphysics of life. 
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If Kant's metaphysics of nature is to limit human understanding by liberating it 
from things in themselves, and his metaphysics of morals is to liberate human reason 
by limiting its dominion, then, his metaphysics of life is the metaphysics of limitation 
and liberation, system and freedom, and is none of these. 
Transcendental idealism bounds nature to human understanding and thus 
opens room for the a priori and gives rise to the metaphysics of nature. 
Transcendental idealism is indeed a revolutionary move: the human race had never 
been in charge of all the necessary laws of nature and the elaborate systematicity of 
the whole world of appearance. However, the metaphysics of nature turns out to be the 
metaphysics of understanding: pure speculative reason takes control over nature and 
dictates to it the a priori laws of understanding by means of the categories. 
However, the story is different once action is on the stage: morality and ethics 
show up. Kantian ethics is a reminder of the legislation of strict parents for their child. 
However, there must be no parent, the child must legislate for herself and practice her 
transcendental freedom. The categorical imperatives are the laws of reason in 
conformity with the laws of understanding and nature: the child must keep in mind the 
a priori commands of her parents and act as if they belong to herself. The metaphysics 
of morals is nothing but fo r one to be in touch with oneself in one's noumenality and 
to keep oneself in tune with the harmony of other reasons. The autonomy of the moral 
agency is (supposedly) intact and the moral laws must be the laws of reason itself. 
Freedom and the moral law necessitate one another and the human being is the 
playground of both. The metaphysics of morals is in this way an attempt to derive 
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laws from freedom, and freedom from the laws. However, at the end of the day, the 
heavy presence of strict parents is undeniable. Moral laws, although securing and 
being secured by transcendental freedom of the child, almost demolish her individual 
freedom and bound her to the laws legislated by the parent of reason. 
There must be a place for the child. There must be a place for her freely to find 
herself, joyfully play in the playground and have the chance to fall in love and to 
practice her freedom. It would be brutal to raise the child in a priority and necessity, 
and then to leave her again to a priority and necessity. The Critique of the Power of 
Judgment is an attempt to make a room for the child of joy and vitality in the mansion 
of reason. 
The reflecting power of judgment shows up in the third Critique with no claim 
of bringing about more a priori principles. There is no need for more necessity, law, 
universality, etc; this is the place of art and life. Metaphysics of life is a way to find a 
place for creation at the middle of strict lawfulness, and a place for practicing freedom 
in the middle of the prison of a priority and necessity. The metaphysics of life departs 
from both the mechanical and the teleological necessities and connects them to each 
other. In the organization of an organized/living being, the mechanical and the 
technical marry, and the material gets to meet the immaterial. A living being is, thus, 
the host of both necessity and freedom, and the present thesis is an effort to 
understand what it is for Kant to be such a being. 
What motivated me to write on this topic was a passage from §65 of Kant's 
Critique of the Power of Judgment in which he makes a rather loose distinction 
between the concepts of organized being (organisierten Wesen) and life (Leben): 
Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property if one calls it an 
analogue of life: but then one must either endow matter as mere matter 
with a property (hylozoism) that contradicts its essence, or else associate 
with it an alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul), in which 
case, however, if such a product is to be a product of nature, organized 
matter as an instrument of the soul is already presupposed, and thus makes 
that product not the least more comprehensible, or else the soul is made 
into an artificer of this structure, and the product must be withdrawn from 
(corporeal) nature. Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is therefore 
not analogous with any causality that we know. (CPJ, 5:374-5) 
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I will argue in this thesis that such a distinction would have a great significance in 
Kant's philosophy in general and specifically in understanding his philosophy of life. 
However, the distinction has usually been underestimated or rejected in the 
scholarship. Rachel Zuckert (2007, 100) for example, takes the distinction as a 
strategy to include plants among living beings rather than taking it as a serious 
distinction which could mean something essential to Kant's philosophy. Functionalist 
scholars of Kant do not even recognize such a distinction, simply because they fight 
for mathematical laws of science and mechanics and they interpret even the most 
explicit metaphysical positions in favor of the exact sciences. Patricia Kitcher ( 1990) 
takes Kant's first Critique as a transcendental psychology and reduces his metaphysics 
and epistemology to a naturalistic philosophy of mind. Biologist scholars such as 
Marcel Quarfood (2004) are even more excited about science than Kant himself was 
about Newtonian physics and deny the inexplicability of organized beings in spite of 
the numerous passages in which Kant explicitly confirms this principle. 
On the other hand, metaphysics-friendly scholars like Henry E. Allison 
( 1992; 1996), although providing some fascinating readings of Kant's metaphysics, 
teleology and biology, prefer to maintain the distinction minimally and emphasize the 
role of the faculties of cognition more than the principle of life itself. For example, in 
Allison's interpretation of Kant's account of freedom, the spontaneity of action is seen 
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as a capacity of rational beings. I will argue that the spontaneity of action is a 
characteristic of life in general and not only of rational beings. In fact, that is one of 
the pivotal distinctions between the concept of life and the organized being (deprived 
of life; hypothetically of course). 
Paul Guyer (2005) provides an exciting reading of the inexplicability of 
organized/living being by insisting on the immateriality of the principle of life, but he 
sadly does not take such a peculiar characteristic seriously enough to give it a worthy 
position in Kant's system of philosophy. I will show that the immateriality of the 
principle of life and the inexplicability of organized beings is one of the central issues 
in Kant's philosophy from its beginning to its end. 
My views are closer to the scholars who insist on the metaphysical interests of 
Kant's philosophy than to the scholars who are more focused on Kant's scientific 
intentions. Concerning Kant's account of organized being and life, my view is strongly 
different from the functionalist, naturalist or merely biological views and is much 
closer to the views of scholars such as Suma Raj iva (2009) and Hannah Ginsborg 
( 1997) who find the purposiveness of organic nature, the inexplicability of organized 
beings and the principle of life in the organized being fundamentally important to 
Kant's accounts of ethics, aesthetics, theology and his metaphysics in general. 
I believe the loose distinction must be seen as strongly significant to Kant's 
system of philosophy since it illuminates a type of being which carries within itself 
two different types of causality: from mechanism, and from freedom. Is the business 
of the metaphysics of nature and of morals anything but to relate these two types of 
causality? I do think that neither of the two is able to open a suitable room for 
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freedom, and this is because they deal with ideals only. Neither the teleology of the 
first Critique, nor the transcendental freedom of the second has a sufficient touchstone 
with the empirical. Laws of understanding and the moral laws of reason are both 
picking the stars from the sky and are unable to sell them to the kids of the 
playground. In these fancy mansions of ideality, the organized/living being offers a 
hand from reality and becomes a manifestation of freedom which could be seen, 
touched, smelt, sympathized with and loved. 
The discussion of the thesis revolves mainly around the topics such as the 
mind-body problem, different implications of the principle of unity, the mechanical 
inexplicability of organized beings, the status of the reflecting power of judgment and 
the principle of purposiveness, the immateriality of the principle of life and its relation 
to the concept of organized being, and the mediatory role of the organized/living being 
in Kant's system of philosophy. The first chapter of the thesis provides a brief 
background to Kant's philosophy of life in the first and the third Critique by 
investigating his critical approach to the concepts of life and organized being in some 
of his pre-Critical works. The pre-Critical works from the Living Forces of 1746 to 
the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer of 1766 manifest Kant's early interest in those concepts. 
The problem of life and organized being shows itself as more of a problem of 
dynamics in Living Forces and is situated in Kant's contemporary debates around the 
concepts of living, active and motive force; and is tightly connected to the mind-body 
problem. Kant's New Elucidation of 1755, while embracing the mind-body problem in 
its relation to epistemology, and revealing one of the first Critical attempts made by 
Kant in order to limit reason within its boundaries, represents a relatively extensive 
account of Kant's distinction between the organic and inorganic nature and escalates, 
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to an extent, the mind-body problem to the question of organization in nature. The last 
two of Kant's pre-Critical works to be discussed in the fust chapter, The Only Possible 
Argument (1763) and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, are mostly focused on the theological 
aspects of the problem of life and organized beings. Although the organization of 
nature and the principle of life provide the grounds of appealing to the concept of God 
as the highest principle of unity, beauty, life and teleology, they are taken to be 
inexplicable within the realm of possible experience. 
The Critique of Pure Reason, which is the main focus of the second chapter of 
this thesis, considers most of the themes mentioned above about the organized being 
and life in the pre-Critical works, mainly from the point of view of reason, its limits, 
and its principles or characteristics such as unity, systematicity, teleology and 
purposiveness. In the Preface to the first Critique, the systematic unity of reason is 
seen as analogous to the organic unity of nature in its organized products. Systematic 
or organic unity is taken as the unity under a concept; as a result, the principles of 
teleology and purposiveness reach a higher level of significance in the investigation of 
the living nature as manifested in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and in 
the Doctrine of the Soul in the Paralogisms. As in the pre-Critical works, the 
organized products of nature remain inexplicable by the laws of mechanics: their 
teleological character takes them beyond the reach of mechanical explanation, and 
allows them to reveal a principle of freedom in their existence, which is the very 
principle of life as the capacity to originate action voluntarily. Thus, the 
organized/living being becomes the battlefield of mechanical necessity versus 
freedom. The mind-body problem of the pre-Critical works is now a battle between 
system and freedom; blind mechanism and teleology. Yet, there is no end to this battle 
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m the first Critique, mainly because pure reason alone is neither armed with the 
accurate instrument in order to handle the challenge of purposiveness and freedom, 
nor has it been prepared to fully welcome them and offer them a precious seat in its 
settlements. 1 
The Critique of the Power of Judgment, as we will see in the third chapter of 
the thesis, is an attempt to settle the battle down by making each side of the conflict 
take one step closer to the other. The reflecting power of judgment is introduced by 
Kant as a faculty of cognition which is closer to nature than pure speculative reason, 
and acts on nature's behalf. Also, the purposiveness of nature is explained as an 
internal principle of purposiveness in the inner organization of the organized being. 
Thus, nature in its organized products opens up a room for the principles of freedom 
and teleology. In this way, a living/organized being becomes the co-product of both 
the technique and the mechanics of nature; and thus manifests both freedom and 
system. 
Therefore, the organized/living being in its dual character plays the peculiar 
role of mediating between metaphysics and physics. From such a perspective we can 
begin to understand the passage of §65. In the conclusion, I wi ll try to make sense of 
that paragraph based on the Kantian interpretation of life I present in the three 
chapters. I conclude that the peculiarity of the inner causality of organized beings and 
the presence of the immaterial principle of life in their existence puts them beyond the 
1 Although there are fascinating aspects of li fe manifested in Kant's practical works, the moral 
perspective of Kant's practical philosophy in relation to the concept of life would take this 
thesis beyond its scope, which is the concept of life in general and not the moraVrational life 
of the human being. 
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metaphysics of nature and beneath the metaphysics of morals. Thus, the living being 
offers its own metaphysical status with its own limits and liberties. 
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Chapter One: 
Pre-Critical works: Mind-Body Problem within the Limits of Reason 
Introduction: 
Most research on Kant's account of the organized being and life starts with the 
Critique of Pure Reason, and is mainly focused on the second part of the third 
Critique. 2 Although such an approach towards Kant's philosophy of life is quite 
legitimate, given that those works are presenting Kant's most extensive and profound 
discussions about life and the organized being; yet, there is a lot more to be learned 
from his pre-Critical works about those concepts. 
The tendency to skip the pre-Critical works in Kant scholarship is based on the 
belief that these works are generally lacking the most significant characteristic of 
Kant's philosophy, i.e. the Critical method. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Kant's 
critical approach towards Cartesian, Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics as well as 
his constant attempt to modify and revise principles of cognition in his pre-Critical 
works is a good support for claiming that the pre-Critical period of Kant's career was 
not at all pre-critical or dogmatic. By evaluating and adjusting the principles of 
cognition within the limits of possible experience, he begins the Critical project of 
limiting reason to its boundaries from his first works such as New Elucidation, Only 
Possible Argument and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. 
2 See the general Introduction. 
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This is not the place to investigate in detail the validity of the above claim but 
it is necessary to mention that it is neither a claim without a background in Kant 
scholarship, nor an idiosyncratic interpretation of Kant's pre-Critical texts which is 
made up ad hoc or without substance. I find my reading of Kant's pre-Critical works 
to be closer to those of the scholars such as Martin SchOnfeld (2006), Graham Bird 
(2009) and Andrew Carpenter (200 1 ), than to the readings in which pre-Critical works 
are overshadowed by the three Critiques and not being taken seriously at all. Thus, the 
present chapter investigates the characteristics of the concepts of life and organized 
being in a few of Kant's pre-Critical works, namely in Living Forces, New 
Elucidation, Only possible Argument and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. 
Starting with the Living Forces of 1746 I will show, briefly, one of Kant's first 
interests in the concept of life as free action and its relation to the systematic order of 
the world. The main themes of the work could be named as the conflict between the 
concepts of living force and matter, and the implications of that conflict in dynamics. 
Kant's New Elucidation (1755) provides a good entry discussion to the mind-
body problem which remains to be one of the main issues in Kant's philosophy of life 
for the rest of his career. By using the concepts of antecedently and consequentially 
determining grounds, Kant tries to explain motion and order in different products of 
nature by making a distinction between organic and inorganic nature, a distinction 
which is going to be one of the central points of the present thesis to its end. 
Only Possible Argument of 1763 offers a more detailed account of the 
distinction between organic and inorganic nature by emphasizing the contingency of 
the inner systematicity of organized beings, and also, by stressing the peculiarity of 
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the living principle in the organic products of nature. Other key points to be mentioned 
in Only Possible Argument are the significance of the principle of teleology to the 
systematic unity of organized beings in their inner reciprocal connections, and the 
relation of that principle (i.e. of teleology) to the principle of life as the principle of 
voluntary action. 
And finally, the immateriality of the principle of life, as well as Kant's 
resistance to metaphysical explanations of that principle which go too far in describing 
living nature by supersensible notions are valuable lessons to be learned about Kant's 
philosophy of life from his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer ( 1766). 3 
Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (LF) of 1746 is where the 
question of life emerges in Kant's works, although philosophy has not yet fully 
become Kant's main concern. He begins his philosophical development with research 
on a concept which is tightly related to the concept of life, i.e. the concept of living 
force . The work is mainly on dynamics and covers the intellectual debates on living 
forces from Descartes to Leibniz and from Newton to Wolff. The first chapter is 
devoted to a metaphysical discussion around the concepts of vis activa, vis matrix and 
vis viva.4 The metaphysical thesis of the first chapter, as Carpenter (200 1, 148) points 
3 Kant's Inaugural Dissertation ( 1770) also contains some re levant points to the topic of this 
thesis. However, since most of these points are covered in the other works I am looking at in 
the thesis; I shall refer to them in footnotes on occasion, instead of including an extensive 
di scussion on the Inaugural Dissertation in the present chapter. 
4 Active force , moving force and living force. 
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out, is to rework the Leibnizian concept of vis active, and also, to offer a solution to 
the mind-body problem based on the notion of transeunt causation. 5 
Kant, firstly, broadens the affectivity of vis activa to external motion and 
change, while the Leibnizian conception of active force is limited to the change in a 
substance's inner state. Secondly, Kant rejects the Wolffian limitation of the 
affectivity of transeunt force to external motion. Thus, Kant finds the Leibnizian view 
too internally oriented and the Wolffian theory too externally directed. According to 
Carpenter, what Kant is looking for is more like an Aristotelian notion of entelechy 
which allows him to explain both internal and external motions with a single force. In 
other words, if vis activa is responsible for both internal and external motion of a 
substance, then, "a single force could cause both motion in bodies and representations 
in soul" (Carpenter 2001). Therefore, although Kant takes the Leibnizian active force 
as being prior to extension (matter and space) as granted- as opposed to Wolffian 
moving force- Kant goes even beyond Leibniz by recognizing external interaction as 
being caused by the inner motion of the substance (Schonfeld 2006, 36). 
Force is, for Kant (LF, 1 :23), prior to matter and space because with no force, 
which is able to act externally, there would be no connection, and without connection 
there would be no order and as a result, no space. The force of his argument consists 
in two main factors : first, the concept of living force emerges from free motion in 
nature (which is most obvious in organized beings), and second, external motion of a 
substance is explicable only with the notion of active force. Yet, although the action is 
5 As opposed to immanent causation, the transeunt causation (intersubstantial causation) is 
the causality of a substance on another. Immanent causation, on the other hand, is when a 
substance acts on itself. According to Leibniz (Monadology, §7, § II ; Discourse on 
Metaphysics, § 14; for more, see: Broad, 1975), no transeunt causation is possible in the 
created world; which is another way of saying the monads do not have windows. 
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originated from an inner active force, but its functioning in the world of matter is 
subject to the laws of physics and dynamics. For instance, a basketball must be shot 
by a force which originated from the living force of the basketball player, but whether 
she scores or not is dependent upon the laws of dynamics. What actually is being done 
here is the replacement of Leibniz's pre-established harmony with a necessary 
harmony established by laws of dynamics and physics. 
Therefore, there is free action on the one hand, and mechanical order, on the 
other. I take this moment to be one of the first occasions of the emergence of Kant's 
involvement with the question of life as free action versus the systematic order of 
nature: a question which never leaves him to the end of his career. 
In New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition of 1755 
(NE) Kant shows more interest in the metaphysical side of the debate about living 
forces and motion in general, and tries to elaborate the principles of cognition instead 
of providing a scientific investigation. The second section of the book provides a 
fascinating discussion about the concept of "ground" (which, I believe, reveals one of 
the roots of Kant's critical project). The concept of a ground, as Kant explains it, is 
necessary for explaining the connection between a subject and a predicate; further, is 
ontologically necessary for said connection to take place in actuality, i.e. to be 
determined. There are two types of determining grounds: those which determine 
antecedently and those which determine consequentially. The former is the ground of 
being and becoming, while the latter is the ground of knowing.6 The antecedently 
6 Kant's peculiar explanation of the difference between the two types of dete1mining ground, 
also gives us a good hint to understand the genesis of the Kantian distinction between 
regulative and constitutive principles. A regulative principle, similar to the consequentially 
determining ground, does not attribute anyth ing to actuality, although it makes knowledge 
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determining ground is the reason why, and determines the actual connection between a 
subject and a predicate, and thus, is the ground of being and becoming. On the other 
hand, the consequentially determining ground is only the ground of knowing, and 
thus, is the reason that (NE, 1 :392). The peculiarity of such a distinction lies on the 
fact that the ground of knowing is itself grounded on the ground of being and 
becoming. Kant's example might make the difference between the two grounds 
clearer: 
I shall take as an example the eclipse of the satellites of Jupiter. I maintain 
that they furnish the ground of knowing that light is propagated 
successively and with a specifiable velocity. But this ground determines 
this truth only consequentially. For if Jupiter had no satellites at all, or if 
no occultation were produced by their successive revolutions, light would, 
nonetheless, still move in time in exactly the same way, although this 
might not, perhaps, be known to us. Or, to rely more heavily on the given 
definition: the phenomena of the satellites of Jupiter, which demonstrate 
the successive motion of light, presupposes precisely that very property of 
light, without which these phenomena could not occur in the way in which 
they do occur. It follows, therefore, that they determine this truth only 
consequentially. However, the ground of becoming, that is to say, the 
ground why the motion of light involves a specifiable expenditure of time 
is to be found (if you adopt the view of Descartes) in the elasticity of the 
elastic globules of the atmosphere. . . . This would be a ground which 
determines antecedently. In other words, it would be a ground such that, 
were it not posited, that which was determinate would not occur at all. 
(NE, 1 :392-3) 
In other words, the antecedently determining ground makes the experience possible 
while the consequential one explains the experience. The former does something in 
actuality, whi le the latter relates the actuality to our cognition. 
As mentioned before, Kant made two moves in his LF to depart from Wolff 
and Leibniz: to relate external motion to some kind of inner active force, and to take 
possible. On the other hand, a constitutive principle, like the antecedently determining ground, 
has the claim of determining things in actuali ty. 
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external motion as the necessary result of inner motion. A similar move is manifested 
here in NE which could be now explained using the concepts of antecedently and 
consequentially determining ground. Kant asserts: 
No change can happen to substances except in so far as they are connected 
with other substances; their reciprocal dependency on each other 
determines their reciprocal changes of state. (NE, 1:41 0) 
On the one hand, motion is possible only in a reciprocal connection between objects, 
and on the other hand, as we saw earlier, reciprocal connections (like any other 
phenomenon in actuality) can take place only if they are grounded by antecedently 
determining ground. Thus, there should be a ground upon which change, and so, 
reciprocal connection is possible: all changes need a ground. 
Now that logic is maintained by Kant in explaining the relation between 
representations and external bodily objects: representations result from a change in 
perception, with the change taking place in the inner state of the soul.7 However, such 
a change cannot possibly occur without actual external existence of external bodies. 
That is to say, the generation of change in our soul, which shows itself as a 
representation- which is in tum a change in our perception- needs an antecedently 
determining ground not only in our soul but also in external reality: according to the 
passage above, change must be determined in a reciprocal relation, i.e. it is intentional 
(in the logical sense). The soul being seen as a simple substance in isolation and with 
no connection to something external cannot even conceive anything as external or 
extended. And an antecedently determining ground cannot determine any change 
solely by an inner force without being connected to other objects, despite what 
Wolffians claimed. As a result, bodily obj ects must exist to shape the determining 
7 See also Kant's Inaugural Dissertation, Paragraphs 4 and 5. 
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ground in accordance with which the consequentially determining ground can make 
knowledge possible: 
... the soul is subject (in virtue of inner state) to inner changes. Since, as 
we have proved, these changes cannot arise from its nature considered in 
isolation and as disconnected from other things, it follows that there must 
be a number of things present outside the soul with which it stands in a 
reciprocal connection. (NE, 1:411) 
The force of Kant's argument lies in two main points: one, the simplicity of the 
soul in isolation, and two, the very existence of representations (of sensible object) the 
generation of which cannot be explained merely by the inner motion of a simple 
substance: "It is likewise apparent from the same considerations that the change of 
perceptions also takes place in conformity with external motion" (NE, 1:412). That is 
to say, the consequentially determining ground as the ground of knowing must have a 
reference to an antecedently determining ground as the ground of being and becoming. 
Thus, the connection between the two grounds is the connection between knowledge 
and actuality, i.e. between mind and body. 
How is this related to the topic of life and organized being? Kant himself 
provides an answer to that question: "some kind of organic body must be attributed to 
all spirits"(NE, 1 :412); and that is a result of the argument explained above. Motion 
and change already exist in the world as real phenomena (as opposed to the Leibnizian 
claim manifested in his theory of pre-established harmony) and thus require a 
determining ground. The ground of change in the sensible world of extension and 
multiplicity cannot be merely rooted in the simple isolated soul, although it is 
originated from there. A simple isolated substance already has a ground due to its 
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inner state which determines it as whatever that substance is; thus, for a change to 
occur, another ground must be added to that substance so the change, as a new 
determination, will be possible to occur. Therefore, the ground of the generation of 
motion is the soul, but such a motion can happen only if some kind of organic body is 
attributed to the soul. 
But why organic body? Kant (NE, 1:413) claims that the co-existence of the 
substances of the universe does not explain the organic relation between them and so 
there is a need for a "certain community of origins" which leads to the harmonious 
dependence of the parts of an organic body. 
Organic relation (or even connection of substances in general) already exists 
between substances and such a relation is possible only if God exists. In other words, 
since all motions are originated from a single source (God's intelligence), as a result, 
all motions, changes, and connections are unified under a single concept which makes 
them harmoniously connected to each other: 
Since, therefore, in so far as each individual substance has an existence 
which is independent of other substances, no reciprocal connection 
occurs between them; and since it does not fall to finite beings to be the 
cause of other substances, and since, nonetheless, all things in the 
universe are found to be reciprocally connected with each other- since 
all this is the case, it has to be admitted that this relations depends on a 
communality of cause, namely on God, the universal principle of beings. 
(NE, 1:413) 
It must be said that, it is not clear here in NE if Kant uses the idea of God to 
explain the organic relation between substances, or vice versa. It seems to me that the 
reason of that vagueness is Kant's unstable explanation of God, and God's position in 
his philosophy. Sometimes Kant employs theological implications of the concept of 
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God to provide metaphysical explanations, and at other times he prefers to make use 
of the metaphysical implications of that concept to prove the theological concept of 
God. The former almost fades away in his Critical philosophy while the latter turns 
out to be one of the main pillars of his Critical project. 8 
What interest me here in NE are two characteristics of organic connections 
mentioned by Kant: first, the unity of all organically connected substances under a 
concept, and second, attributing the generation of that connection to a teleological 
principle. In this way, the very existence of organic relations in the universe not only 
shows a systematic relation established in a harmonious way, but also manifests the 
existence of a teleological active force which is the ultimate ground of the harmonious 
connection between substances. Unity under a concept is the very meaning of 
teleology, and is the ground of the existence of the organized being. Unity and 
teleology are combined in the organic products of nature. This peculiar connection 
between the concepts of unity and teleology will be discussed in more detail once I get 
into the second chapter. 
The Only Possible Argument to Support a Demonstration of the Existence of 
God (OPA) of 1763 sheds more light on Kant's conception of organized and living 
beings by using a similar logic to what we have seen up until now in LF and NE. The 
first point to be mentioned here is Kant's emphasis on the role of purposiveness and its 
necessary connection to understanding; we saw in LF that this is by the activity of the 
active force that connection is possible between substances. Now, by the same token, 
Kant (OPA, 2:88-93) claims that the very harmonious beautiful order recognized in 
animals and plants, plus the contingency of such a harmony, lead us to confirm the 
8 See Inaugural Dissertation, Paragraph 22. 
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existence of an understanding. What is new here is the emphasis on the contingency of 
the reciprocal relation between the parts of organisms. 
Order and harmony in organic nature differ from the necessary order of the 
inorganic one. As Kant asserts: 
There is manifest in this case great art and a contingent combination of 
factors which has been made by free choice in accordance with certain 
intentions ... The structure of plants and of animals displays a constitution 
of this kind; and it is a constitution which cannot be explained by appeal to 
the universal and necessary laws of nature. (OPA, 2:114) 
It is possible to explain mechanically the order of inorganic nature because it ts a 
result of the necessary laws of nature in their application to actuality (although, 
according to Kant, the very necessary unity proves the existence of a creator). 
However, organic nature is beyond the grasp of mechanical explanation because the 
different parts of an organized body do not suggest any necessary ground for their 
reciprocal connection other than the purpose they are made to meet. For example, 
nothing in the mechanical nature alone necessitates the existence of reciprocal relation 
between eyes and fingers! Mechanically speaking, they are two independent 
phenomena with two different grounds and nothing (mechanical) can make them 
relate to each other in an organic fashion. Such a contingency cannot be seen in the 
inorganic products of nature. For example, a piece of rock is in no meaningful9 (i.e. 
purposive) reciprocal connection with the ocean. The only reciprocal relation they 
have is the result of the necessary laws of physics (science): they reciprocally affect 
one another, but only in the way which is necessitated by their mechanical 
characteristics. And more than that, the necessary causal relation between a piece of 
9 Aesthetic meanings excluded. 
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rock and the ocean is not aimed at any goal which is determined internally by their 
purposive constitution. The type of interconnection between eyes and fingers is 
different due to its purposiveness: they are related to each other in order to achieve a 
goal, which is the survival of the animal of which they are the parts .10 To use Kant's 
example, the profound harmony of celestial bodies and the complex order of their 
connection can be explained by Newtonian law of gravitation, and according to Kant, 
it could be claimed that it is possible to explain the whole harmony of inorganic nature 
by investigating the universal laws by which such a harmony and unity is necessarily 
produced. Nonetheless, such a necessary unity cannot be attained in the case of 
organic nature. No law of nature necessitates the unity of different organs, because 
none of the organs necessitates the other unless for the sake of the whole. The unity in 
this case is contingent and is a product of artifice. 
Therefore, orgamc nature is distinguished from inorganic nature: the unity 
under which the inorganic nature is ordered is a matter of natural necessity, but the 
unity in the case of organic nature cannot be necessitated by nature alone; there has to 
be a will to necessitate the contingent. And that is the meaning of purposive or 
teleological relation. 11 
Kant does not say it explicitly but I believe he would find it accurate to say 
that different organs of an organism are unified under different grounds, while in the 
case of inorganic nature a single ground suffices for the explanation of its unity, i.e. 
God's will. That is to say, as if the unity and harmony in an organized product of 
10 See also Inaugural Dissertation, Paragraphs I and 2. 
11 It would be fruitful to our later discussions if we notice that Kant (OPA, 2: 121 - 124) asserts 
what leads us towards the contingent uni ty of organic nature is the impossibility of explaining 
it mechanically and not just because a mechanical explanation is too difficult to attain. 
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nature is the unity of, and harmony between, different grounds, not of, and between, 
different objects under a single ground which results the necessary laws of nature. 
Each organ has its own reason why, and an organic being as a whole is a combination 
of those reasons under a single one which is the purpose of that organized being. For 
example, the reason why of an eye is to see, and the reason why of an ear is to hear, 
and yet they are reciprocally connected to each other under a more general ground 
which is the animal for whom eyes and ears are different organs. 
Such a distinction between organic and inorganic nature elevates the unity of 
organized nature beyond the harmony of an inorganic one: unity of different grounds 
is possible only as a product of choice and artifice, and not as a product of natural 
necessity. 12 The immediate ground of the unity of different grounds, as I understand it, 
is the life of the organized being, and the ground of the existence of such amazing 
unity, according to Kant, is God's wi ll: 
Take the example of the structure of an animal. Its organs of sense 
perception are connected w ith organs of voluntary movement and life, and 
connected in such an ingenious fashion that once one's attention has been 
drawn to it, one would have to be of ill-natured disposition (for no one could 
be so unreasonable) not to recognize the existence of a W ise Author, who 
had so excellently ordered the matter of which the animal was constituted. 
(OPA, 2: 125) 
The connection between sense perception and voluntary action is also a contingent 
connection, meaning that, necessary laws of nature do not presuppose or necessitate 
such a harmonious connection between minds and bodies. Mechanical laws are the 
12 In a general sense, both organic and inorganic natures are products of God's choice; the 
point is, in the case of organic beings, there must be a specific purpose and intention within 
the organized being itself to gather all the different organs under a specific unity under which 
the organized being as a whole becomes possible. This view of purposiveness is what 
develops in the third Critique as "internal (objective) purposiveness". 
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necessary laws of motion in matter and do not allow any contingency due to which the 
principle of life as the capacity to act voluntarily could result. Now that such a 
principle is found in corporeal nature, it cannot be explained mechanically: teleology 
is needed in order to explain such a mysterious community of matter and life. Yet, all 
teleology can do, is to point to a higher intention (idea, concept) which could serve as 
the ground of the possibility of such a community. Yet, even teleology cannot explain 
the quality and the characteristics of such a community since no empirical experience 
provides us with any data about those characteristics. 
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (OS) of 1766 is 
a work dedicated to emphasize that inexplicability. The "spirit-seer" Kant refers to in 
the title was a theological mystic figure named Schwedenberg (1688-1772) claimed to 
be in touch with "spirits" and being able to communicate with "ghosts". Kant's work 
was written mainly to refute the validity of the claims of "metaphysicians" to be in 
touch with supersensible entities. The first part of the book, the "dogmatic" part, 
contains a few points about Kant's position on the concept of life which are quite 
fruitful to our discussion. The purpose of the book, as mentioned above, is to refute all 
claims about spirit-beings and it shows Kant's attempt to save nature from ad hoc 
explanations based on spirituality, and inclinations of "lazy reason" to put the burden 
of explanation on the shoulders of some alien supernatural entity. His arguments 
against such explanations do not seem to offer anything new from what had been 
already mentioned in the history of philosophy; namely, arguments based on 
impenetrability of matter, simplicity of the soul and its shapelessness, 
incommunicability of a supposed "spirit-world", and difficulties of explaining a causal 
relation between matter and spirit. 
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What is new in his arguments is his Critical approach towards this matter, 
namely, to investigate the possibility and validity of such claims based on the limits of 
our reason: 
... if this enqmry should tum into philosophy ... and if it should have 
knowledge not only of the objects themselves but also of their relation to the 
human understanding, its frontiers will contract in size and its boundary-
stones will be securely fixed. (OS, 2:369) 
Kant, then, defines metaphysics as "a science of the limits of human reason" (OS, 
2:368) and finds supernatural explanations beyond those limits. In this way, although 
the existence of an immaterial principle as the ground of life in nature is considered as 
undeniable, nothing can be said about the community of such a principle with matter 
and its conditions. Therefore, claims about the spirit-world and anything related to it 
are beyond the limits of human reason which is situated here on the earth and is bound 
to the clandestine life . 
It is important to see what Kant refutes, and what he finds beyond refutation in 
claims about spiritual and immaterial principles and beings. What he finds beyond the 
limits of reason and thus nonsensical is any positive claim about the existence of 
spirits and ghosts as independent creatures from the material world, and the possibility 
of communicating with those creatures in the way that someone like Schwedenberg 
maintains. Those claims have no reference to the empirical world and thus cannot be 
trusted. Such claims should not be taken seriously and even are likely to be the signs 
of madness or charlatanry, Kant asserts in DS. 
However, there are at least two phenomena which do not allow Kant to refute 
the existence of immaterial principles in the material world altogether: the 
phenomenon of life, and that of moral faith. Kant explicitly makes it clear that by 
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refutation of spirit-beings he is not rejecting the mysterious principle of life: "I must 
confess that I am very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial nature in the 
world, and to place my own soul in the class of these beings"(DS, 2:327). And he 
explains the reason of that inclination in an extensive footnote: 
It is a reason which applies at the same time to the sentient being of animals. 
The principle of life is to be found in something in the world which seems to 
be of an immaterial nature. For all life is based upon the inner capacity to 
determine itself voluntarily. (DS, 2:327) 
As Kant explains his standpoint, the main characteristic of matter is that it fills the 
space (i.e. it is extended) "in virtue of a necessary force" and is limited by external 
forces. In other words, matter is bound to the law of inertia and its motion is 
necessitated by external forces and by its relation with other material substances. 
Therefore, the material is "dependent" and "constrained". On the other hand, the 
principle of life as the principle of spontaneity of action implies a kind of 
determination which is not externally necessitated (in its generation), but is possible 
only from an inner capacity. Thus, the living principle "can scarcely be of material 
nature" (DS, 2:327). 
Although the existence of the immaterial principle of life is not denied, its 
community with body cannot be explained, because it demands data to be attained 
from beyond the realm of possible experience. The community of the principle of life 
and body remains an insoluble mystery. Hylozoism and materialism cannot explain 
that community because of their inappropriate reductionism. Hylozoism attributes the 
principle of life to matter while materialism has no room for such a principle. The 
claim of the former is contradictory because it attributes the principle of spontaneous 
motion to a substance which is by definition determined by the law of inertia, and the 
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latter simply "deprives everything of life" (DS, 2:330) and does not offer a solution to 
the problem of the community between the principle of life and matter. 13 
Therefore, orgaruc nature manifests both the signs of the material and the 
immaterial, but does not offer any ground for the possible experience to investigate the 
community of the two. Moreover, even the term "community" (Gemeinschaft) is being 
used only problematically, because it says too much about that which we cannot 
possibly know. Therefore, l(fe, due to its immateriality, goes beyond the limits of 
reason and cannot be known. 
To sum up, organized being manifests a contingent systematicity. The 
contingency of its organization leads to teleology and purposiveness, and is a result of 
the living principle in its existence as the capacity of originating action voluntarily. 
Thus, the organized being contains in itself a lawfulness and necessity hand in hand 
with freedom and contingency. Such a communion of antinomies cannot be 
understood within the limits of reason, because life is not what matter can handle; 
freedom is not something the scientific reason can understand. 
Conclusion: 
Kant was engaged with the problem of life in the form of the mind-body 
problem from the beginning of his philosophical career. From his Living Forces of 
1746 to Dreams of a Spirit-seer of 1766, the concept of l~fe and the systematic 
13 As we will see in next chapters, Kant's opposing approach towards hylozoism, materialism 
and spiritualism is also manifest in the first and the third Critique. 
26 
organization of the living nature remained a mystery to him. The contingent 
systematic organization of the organic nature on the one hand, and the capacity of 
living beings to act voluntarily manifest the signs of two apparently incompatible ways 
of existence: material and immaterial. The difficulty in conjoining the two poles 
escalates in his later works to more fundamental problems such as the problem of 
freedom, teleology, theology and even of the accuracy of scientific explanation of 
living beings. Kant, on the on hand, is not inclined to refuse the immateriality of the 
principle of life and the necessity of a concept of purposiveness to the systematic order 
of organized beings, and on the other, cannot allow a supernatural explanation for the 
problem of community of the material and the immaterial which goes beyond the 
limits of reason. ln this way, the Critique of Pure Reason investigates the problem 
within the realm of reason, and the Critique of the Power of Judgment elaborates the 
purposiveness and liveliness of the living nature in Kant's system of philosophy. 
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Chapter Two: 
Critique of Pure Reason: Organized or Living? System or Freedom? 
All or Nothing? 
Introduction: 
As shown in chapter one, Kant's engagement with the question of life in his 
pre-Critical works is mainly manifested as the question of soul and its community 
with body. Due to the immateriality of the principle of life, any explanation of such a 
community goes beyond the limits of reason, and thus, the question of life stays 
somehow unanswered and insoluble. Three central concepts were involved in his 
investigation about organized/living beings in his pre-Critical works: soul (or mind), 
body, and reason. 
However, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the two first concepts above become 
more or less overshadowed by the concept of pure reason. The kingdom of pure 
reason arises with a fully-equipped army and dominates almost everything with the 
alibi of limiting its territory: everything must be kept within the limits of pure reason 
and anything beyond those limits is either unrecognized, or unknowable. 
Wise emperors do not leave their empires to the hands of chaos and choice: 
everything must be taken under control and be kept in its specific place in their 
kingdom. A system, an organization, an order must be elaborated with scrutiny in 
order to accomplish that goal. The third Critique is usually seen as the book of system; 
I think, perhaps, the Critique of Pure Reason is more worthy of such a name. From its 
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Preface to its Doctrine of Method, the book is dedicated to elaborate a system of 
reason, and to make sense of nature systematically. 
As expected, the question of organized being and life is sunk into the question 
of system in the first Critique. The mind-body problem of the pre-Critical Kant 
escalates to the problem of unity and multiplicity: the king of pure reason and its unity 
on the one side, and the territory of empirical multiplicity on the other. 
Nevertheless, it turns out that among the servants of the king, there is a class 
which is not subordinate to him and has the claim of having a system for itself: a 
system which offers in itself a place for freedom. That class, the organized nature, 
manifests a system even more wisely elaborated than the one built by the king, i.e. by 
understanding( or pure reason in general). Organized being is an organization of 
freedom and that is what makes it alive: it is the commonwealth of opposing states. 
With that peculiar characteristic, where can we situate the organized being in 
Kant's system of reason and nature? Kant does not provide a detailed or an extensive 
answer to that question in the first Critique, and thus leaves his readers and scholars in 
numerous difficulties in answering that question. Most of the scholars who try to 
provide an answer to that question, like Paul Guyer (2005) in his Kant's system of 
Nature and Freedom, and John H. Zammito ( 1992) in his commentary on Kant's third 
Critique do not find a better way to find the answer than by looking for it in Kant's 
practical philosophy and in his third Critique. And that is because the organization of 
organized being, in its explanation, calls for the concepts which are not fitlly 
elaborated in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the concepts of judgment, 
purposiveness of nature, freedom etc. 
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However, as far as we are concerned with the first Critique, the concept of 
organized and living being is mainly discussed with its relation to the concepts of 
systematic unity, mechanical causality of nature, and only weakly to the concepts of 
freedom and teleology. Yet, I believe that even in these types of discussions, there is 
still room for the organized being and the concept of life as manifesting freedom and 
purposiveness. 
To support this point, I will start with the Preface to the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason in order to describe Kant's approach to the concept of 
organized being from the point of view of the systematic unity of reason. Then, by 
investigating the different implications and meanings of the concept of unity in the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, I will try to find a place for the concept of 
"inexplicability of organized beings" by mechanical laws. I will also investigate Kant's 
account of life in the Doctrine of the Soul in the Paralogisms. As Guyer (2005) 
suggests, Kant's discussion of the unity of nature is in conflict with the inexplicability 
of organized beings. I will try to situate and challenge Guyer's notion of conflict, in 
Kant's discussions about unity, causality, soul and teleology in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. The inexplicability of organized being, as I understand it, is never denied in 
the first Critique. Such inexplicability, accompanied by the unity of nature as a whole, 
and the spontaneity of the principle of animality (which could also be seen in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science), says at least two things about Kant's 
philosophy of life: first, the living being, due to the principle of life as the faculty of 
spontaneity, while being a part of the system of nature, does not belong solely to the 
mechanical causality of nature; and second, if there is a system of nature, it must save 
room for freedom if it is also to include living beings. In this way, l(fe might be seen 
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as a breaking point for the systematicity of nature and reason as explained in the first 
Critique: a breaking point the system tries to embrace. Thus, although the first 
Critique shows a tendency to build that room for life and freedom, it is only in the 
third Critique that the whole system is adjusted in order to accomplish that 
construction. Perhaps, this is why the third Critique is known as the book of system: it 
attempts to elaborate a system of freedom. 
In the Preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) Kant 
compares the system of science, i.e. of metaphysics with an organized body; an 
analogy which could also be recognized in the Cannon and the Architectonic of Pure 
reason: 
. .. pure speculative reason is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity 
entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized 
body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist 
for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation 
unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing 
relation to the entire use of pure reason.14 (CPR, Bxxiii) 
Unity is mentioned as the first characteristic of an organized body; a unity which 
stands for itself in independence. The possibility of such a unity demands a systematic 
14 As Zammito ( 1992, 174) reads the passage above, "What is so significant about this 
connection with organic fonn is the nature of causality that applies in such forms : immanent, 
holistic, and simultaneous", and he takes it as "the key to the idea of the "unity of reason" ." 
Although Zamrnito's point about the peculiarity of the inner causality of organized being is a 
legitimate point regarding Kant's discussion about organized beings in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, the significance of the organic unity of reason is more vital in Kant's 
discussion in the first Critique. There are metaphysical points asserted in CPR about the 
organic unity of reason which should not be missed or underestimated. 
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interconnection between multiplicities, and whenever such a systematic unity is found 
in nature, it would be a great source of amazement due to its distinguished peculiarity 
among the products of nature. How must such a unity be understood, and what are the 
difficulties in explaining that unity in nature? Is it possible at all to explain the very 
possibility of such a unity in nature? What does this unity say about the products of 
nature which manifest that unity? How is it possible for an organized body to perform 
a subsisting, independent unity which also could be found in pure reason if unity in 
nature, organic or inorganic, must take place in accordance with the laws of 
understanding and pure reason? 
The interconnection of different parts of an organic whole immediately shows 
a causal relation between them. Also the connection of the totality of an organic whole 
with its parts must become possible through a kind of causal relation. How do these 
causal relations work and are they different types of causalities? And again, what do 
causal relations in organic nature tell us about organized beings as living beings in 
general and their characteristics, given that the systematic unity within living beings 
due to its contingency calls for a type of causality different from the necessary 
causality we see in dead nature? 
After the Prefaces and the Introduction Kant explains his Transcendental 
Idealism by elaborating the thesis of a priority as the necessary and universal concepts 
of understanding. In the Transcendental Aesthetic he investigates space and time as 
the pure forms of intuition and the conditions of possible experience: all experience is 
spatio-temporal. He introduces the categories as the a priori principles of 
understanding-in the Transcendental Analytic- through which experience and 
knowledge become possible. The relation of the categories to metaphysics and also 
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their application m empiricality through schematism IS also explained m 
Transcendental Deduction and Analy tic of Principles. 
I will focus on the Transcendental Dialectic for the next little while, where 
Kant tries to keep pure reason within its limits in its different uses. Paralogisms of 
Pure Reason and the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic are the sections I am 
going to spend the most time on, because they also have a focus on the limitations of 
the application of pure reason concerning the concept of the soul. We will also have a 
look at Kant's accounts of causality as explained in the resolution of the Antinomies of 
Pure Reason in order to get an insight into the differences between the causality as 
manifested by the necessary laws of mechanics, and the causality from freedom which 
is related to the principle of life as the capacity to originate action fro m an inner 
principle. 
As Kant asserts in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of CPR, 
. .. the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would 
have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of understanding, and, 
lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth; thus in regard to the 
latter we simply have to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as 
objectively valid and necessary. (CPR, A65 1/B679) 
The very existence and function of reason imply a meaningful interconnection 
between its concepts in conformity with understanding's cognitions. Moreover, the 
unity of reason must be transcendental and objective, while being regulative. It is 
regulative because it is a transcendental law of reason which is not related directly to 
an external obj ect; rather, it is a "projected" principle which unifies the understanding 
and makes it possible for such a thing as pure reason to exist. Therefore, the organic 
unity of reason is not just about its purposive causality, but more than that, is the 
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ground of the possibility of its existence. There is manifoldness on one side as 
experience, and unity as idea on the other. And whenever such a dichotomy exists, a 
systematic unity is necessarily needed in order to relate them to one another. It is only 
through an organic systematicity among the manifolds that they can be unified. 
Otherwise, nature would be nothing but mere aggregate of substances; and in the lack 
of systematic unity, no knowledge of nature is possible, and nature itself as the sum 
total of all objects of experience can never exist as a whole. In other words, systematic 
unity is nothing but the systematic interconnection of its parts and their connection to 
the whole as the unifying concept under which they can exist as a self-subsisting 
whole. 
The principle of unity is a regulative principle of reason which consists of 
ideas which are being applied in the empirical use of reason, and as a result, this 
principle does not say anything about the objective reality in its noumenality. 
Therefore, such a principle is hypothetical and projective, meaning that, it is a law of 
reason upon which understanding works in a way as if such a unity actually exists in 
nature in order to make nature understandable. As a result, all pure reason and 
understanding can do is approximate that unity in nature, and not grasp it in its 
totality. The principle of unity is necessary for the use of reason, and not for the 
constitution of nature in itself as noumenon (CPR, A647/B675-A650/B678). 
One way to look at this matter is to result from the regulative character of the 
principle of unity a purely skeptical approach, and to deny its validity altogether. 
Nonetheless, there are more fascinating points (in my opinion) which could result 
from the regulativity of the principle of unity. If the principle upon which science is to 
become possible is a regulative principle, then, the practical conformity between the 
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principles of pure reason and nature leads us towards the conclusion that, therefore, 
there is yet a higher unity under which reason and nature could be unified. In this way, 
such a principle can make a profound connection between mind (manifesting 
freedom), body (manifesting mechanical necessity), and nature as a whole (at large), 
which includes both minds and bodies. There must be a greater harmony taking place 
between the laws of reason and that of nature in a wider perspective. Thus, there are 
different types of unities in different levels and different meanings. 
There are different types of unity and different ways to explain and understand 
them. Logical unity is one of those types. Reason's logical principle of unity unifies 
the multiplicities under a principle as long as experience allows. By doing so, 
understanding (in general) becomes possible, while otherwise our knowledge would 
be nothing but aggregates of perceptions. The logical principle of unity is only a 
projective and hypothetical unity which works for the benefit of reason, and does not 
ascribe that unity to be found in nature in actuality (CPR, A648/B676). 
There is yet another type of unity and activity of unification by reason which is 
more fundamental than the logical unity, and is the ground of it. This fundamental 
principle is reason's transcendental principle of unity which "would be a 
transcendental principle of reason, which would make systematic unity not merely 
something subjectively and logically necessary, as method, but objectively necessary" 
(CPR, A648/B676). According to that principle, reason seeks for systematic unity in 
nature based on an a priori concept which is in conformity with the laws of nature, 
and reason's empirical use. Thus, the logical unity would have no ground for its 
validity if it is not supported by the transcendental principle of unity, because there 
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would be no justification at all for reason in its logical use to prefer systematic unity 
of nature over taking it as mere aggregate of manifoldness (CPR, A651 /B679). 
Kant provides an example of different applications of reason in unifying 
multiplicities: "Among the different kinds of unity according to concepts of the 
understanding belongs the causality of a substance, which is called "power"" (CPR, 
A648/B676). There is a diversity of different powers in different substances, as there 
is a diversity of their effects. For example, there is a variety of powers of the human 
mind: "the power to distinguish, pleasure, desire, etc." (CPR, A649/B677). The logical 
principle of unity, by means of comparison, finds the similarities and "hidden 
identities" between the multiplicities of powers and unifies them under certain general 
powers which are called "fundamental powers". Then, the fundamental powers could 
be compared to one another and be collected under a yet more general power: "the 
absolutely fundamental power". The logical principle of unity seeks for commonalities 
between different substances in the empirical, and unifies the identical ones under a 
more general concept or category. 
Yet, the logical principle of unity does not explain the very tendency reason 
has towards unification in its logical use: 
For by what warrant can reason in its logical use claim to treat the 
manifoldness of the powers which nature gives to our cognition as merely 
a concealed unity, and to derive them as far as it is able from some 
fundamental power, when reason is free to admit that it is just as possible 
that all powers are different in kind, and that its derivation of them from a 
systematic unity is not in conformity with nature? (CPR, A651 /B679) 
Thus, there should be a transcendental concept of unity as an a p riori principle which 
necessitates reason in its logical use to seek for unity in nature. It is only on the ground 
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of the transcendental principle of unity that reason's logical principle of unity can 
exist. And more importantly, it is only because of the transcendental principle that the 
systematic unity of nature could be seen as objective15 (CPR, A651/B679). 
Guyer (2005, 87) takes the systematic unity of reason and of nature explained 
here as implying that there is a single fundamental cause (the fundamental power) by 
referring to which we can approximate a single type of explanation for the multiplicity 
of the properties of nature, and he takes that universal unity as being in conflict with 
inexplicability of organized beings by mechanical laws of nature. According to Guyer 
(2005), if the unity of all properties of nature under a single fundamental concept of 
causality exists, then it must be possible to explain organized beings based on the very 
universal laws by which we explain the rest of nature. Therefore, he claims that Kant 
changed his mind about the principle of unity from the first to the third Critique, 
because it is in the third Critique that Kant emphasizes the inexplicability of organized 
beings. 
Guyer explains this issue and the apparent conflict by going through Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (CPJ) and Opus Postumum (OP). I would like instead, to 
offer a possible solution to Guyer's puzzle based on the CPR. I believe, although 
inexplicability of organisms and their strange case is explained in more detail in CP J 
and OP, there are at least some textual supports in CPR to claim that organized beings 
have been already taken as mechanically inexplicable in the first Critique. 16 Kant's 
discussion in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic leaves room for this 
15 In the Kantian use of the term, of course. 
16 In fact, as l showed in the fi rst chapter, inexplicability of organized beings can be tracked 
down to Kant's pre-Critical works. 
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inexplicability and the earlier discussion of the Paralogisms locates this 
inexplicability in the organized being's community of body and soul. 
The first point to mention is the type of unity and process of unification Kant 
explains in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of CPR. There are at least 
two types of unity (as I distinguish them, although they are not explicitly 
differentiated by Kant), one of them is the unity under laws or rules, and the other one 
is unity under a concept or an idea as a ground. Based on the former, multiplicities 
could be unified because of their following the same law, and according to the latter, 
the unifying element is an idea which is at the same time the (consequentially 
determining) ground of the possibility of the very multiplicities and their laws. 
According to Kant (CPR, A 11 3), a law is "the representation of a universal condition" 
according to which a certain manifold must be posited. In this way, laws are only 
representations of universals and not the universals themselves. There must be an a 
priori principle based on which the law could be applied to nature, and that is indeed 
the very meaning of transcendentality. Therefore, the unity explained by the unifying 
power of the law is not yet a fundamental unity since it itself resulted from an a priori 
principle: a principle which leads to a rule and is itself a concept. Now, if the unity of 
reason and of nature imply the identity of their laws, then Guyer would be totally right 
in assuming that organized beings must be explicable by mechanical laws. However, 
the unity of reason is a type of unity which stands beyond the mechanical unity of 
nature. Mechanical causality shapes a systematic unity of nature in accordance with 
the laws of reason, and the mechanical law is not the highest law of reason itself. The 
laws of reason and of nature are themselves subject to a yet higher unity which is the 
highest idea possible. I would like to go even further and claim that, if Guyer is right 
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and the laws of reason and of nature as a whole are identical, then even the 
supersensible should be explicable by laws of mechanics. The fact that the 
multiplicities of fundamental powers are reducible to an absolutely fundamental 
power (CPR, A650/B678) does not make them identical nor does it annihilate the 
distinctions between multiplicities. On the contrary, as we will see, difference, 
distinction, and multiplicity are essential components of systematic unity. 
As we see in the Appendix, there are three principles by which reason provides 
unity for the understanding (and they can be taken as the conditions of unity in 
general): sameness of kind or homogeneity, variety or specification, and affinity or 
continuity. There is a dialectical relation between these three principles of reason: the 
first is responsible for unifying the manifoldness of kinds under higher genera, the 
second makes manifoldness possible under lower species, and the third is the unity of 
the first and the second: 
... the last arises by uniting the first two, according as one has completed 
the systematic connection in the idea by ascending to higher genera, as 
well as descending to lower species; for then all manifolds are akin one to 
another, because they are all collectively descended, through every degree 
of extended determination from a single highest genus. (CPR, A658/B686) 
Thus, according to Kant, the principle of homogeneity guards against the 
manifoldness of original genera under which the manifold of spec1es are 
interconnected to each other following the law of specification. The second law is also 
a principle of unity: a principle which makes multiplicities possible. If there is no 
multiplicity or difference, there will be no connection and interconnection between 
parts in a system, because the parts would not exist as parts if they are not unified 
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under a concept, and thus, are not parts of a whole. 17 And with no parts, . there would 
be no connection, and with no connection, no systematicity. In other words, the 
concept of "part" is intentional, meaning that, a part is always a part "of' a whole and 
is in connection with other parts which are also parts of the same whole. As mentioned 
in the first chapter, a ground is what determines a subject (being the unity) in its 
relation to a predicate (being the multiplicity), meaning that, both .subject and 
predicate are necessary to the concept of a ground. Following the :same logic, 
systematic unity, as the ground of the existence of the laws of nature in accordance 
with the laws of understanding, is the unity of multiplicities under a general concept. 
And that is because, for a systematic unity to make sense and take place, there must be 
both a manifold of parts, and also a concept of a whole under which those parts are 
unified. 18 
The concept of systematic unity can unify multiplicities under a general 
concept which embraces the different mechanisms, laws, concepts, and sub-systems in 
itself. Therefore, the inner law of the interconnection of the parts of organized beings 
does not have to be identical to the law of natural causality merely because both of 
them are generalized under a single concept. As a matter of fact, this is one of the 
most important peculiarities of organized beings. To say that all of nature,, organic and 
inorganic, must be subject to the laws of mechanics does not follow at ,all from the 
transcendental or logical principles of unity. Organic and inorganic natur~ can be seen 
as two different genera with commonalities and distinctions. The fact that the two 
genera are unified under the concept of nature (in general) as a whole, implies both 
their commonalities and distinctions. It seems that Guyer recognizes the first law of 
17 See chapter one. 
18 And this is also the meaning of synthesis for Kant. 
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unity, i.e. of homogeneity, as granted, but underestimates the second law that is the 
law of specification. 
Furthermore, the third law as mentioned above is the law of continuity and 
provides a higher unity which is the unity of the two principles. The type of unity 
suggested by the mechanical laws of nature is (by analogy) of the first one, namely the 
unity of all the species of the same kind under a single homogenous genus, and not a 
unity of the third type. The law of continuity in tum demands a transcendental law as 
its transcendental ground and thus stands before all the manifo ldness. This unity is not 
a result of manifoldness; rather, the manifoldness is grounded in such a transcendental 
unity. Therefore, the first two principles of systematic unity mentioned above can be 
seen as laws only in so far as they are united under the idea of a highest unity. 19 
As opposed to unity under law, there is unity under a concept or idea. This 
type of unity is the ground of the possibility of multiplicities: it is the assumption of an 
a prior concept upon which the laws are grounded. In other words, this unity works as 
nexus .finalis as opposed to, and above, the unity under the law which is based on 
nexus effectivus (CPR, A687 /B715). For example, the unity of nature under the laws 
of mechanics is a unity based on the causal relation between multiplicities; but the 
unity of the different parts of an organism is a unity based on a concept which is at the 
same time the purpose of its existence. According to Kant, the highest unity based on 
the principle of purposiveness "opens up for our reason, as applied to the field of 
experience, entirely new prospects for connecting up things in the world in accordance 
with teleological laws, and thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among 
them"(CPR, A687/B715). Therefore, the laws of reason and the laws of nature are 
19 This is also in confonnity with Kant's objection to Leibniz' pre-established harmony. 
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possible only if there is a teleological law above them, which is in tum made possible 
by the highest idea. Furthermore, if there is a law under which the unity of nature and 
of reason is grounded, that law would not be the law of mechanics since the law of 
mechanics is itself grounded in the teleological law. 
I need to mention two points regarding the concept of highest unity as the 
ground of the laws of nature in order to avoid being misunderstood.2° First, the 
mechanical laws, as the necessary laws of nature, do not owe the necessity of their 
inner causality to anything external to nature itself. In other words, the teleological 
concept of unity, i.e. the idea of the highest unity, is only a regulative principle of 
reason and should not be taken as constitutive: "it is nothing but a regulative 
principle" (CPR, A688/B716). To take that principle as constitutive annihilates the 
necessity of natural laws and makes science impossible. However, it is important to 
notice that the regulative principle of the highest unity is also necessary for the 
possibility of nature as a whole: "This highest formal unity . . . makes it necessary to 
regard every ordinance in the world as if it had sprouted from the intention of a 
highest reason" (CPR, A686/B714). Therefore, on the one hand, nature in its 
mechanical products is bound to the necessary laws of mechanics, and on the other 
hand, the whole of nature is only possible if it is unified under an idea as its highest 
purpose. That remark supports my distinction between unity under a law and unity 
under an idea: the highest unity is a mere idea which works as a ground and does not 
interfere in the necessary laws of nature. As Kant puts it: "The regulative principle [of 
the highest unity]21 demands that systematic unity be presupposed absolutely as a 
20 Since the relation between mechanical and teleological laws in CPR is a controversia l issue 
among Kant scholars. 
? ! 
- Added by me. 
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unity of nature that is recognized not only empirically but also a priori, though still 
indeterminately, and hence as following from the essence of things" and, it "is only in 
the idea as a ground for the harmonious use of reason" (CPR, A693/B721 ). Therefore, 
the necessity of natural laws is intact as natural necessity, but it is at the same time 
grounded in the regulative idea of the highest unity. In other words, the highest idea is 
only a consequentially determining ground, as opposed to being antecedently: "if I 
antecedently make a highest ordering being the ground, then the unity of nature will in 
fact be done away with" (CPR, A693/B721). As shown in chapter one, an 
antecedently determining ground is the ground of being and becoming of the one 
which is grounded. Here, Kant says that the highest idea of teleological unity should 
not be taken as the ground of the determinacy of the laws of nature in empiricality, 
because the highest idea (being God's will) annihilates the necessity of those laws and 
makes them contingent upon God's will. Yet, the idea of highest unity is the ground of 
the possibility of the unity of nature as a whole, consequentially. This means that, the 
necessary harmonious causality of natural22 laws necessitates reason to presuppose an 
idea as the ground of a highest unity. 
The second point is that Kant does not take the universal systematic unity of 
nature to be the unity under mechanical laws; rather, he takes it as the unity in relation 
to the idea of a highest intelligence: 
These disadvantageous consequences come to view even more clearly in 
the case of the dogmatism of our idea of a highest intelligence and the 
teleological system of nature .. . that is falsely grounded on it.23 ... This 
mistake can be avoided if we do not consider from the viewpoint of ends 
merely a few parts of nature, e.g. , the distribution of dry land, its structure 
22 Used transcendentally and not dogmatically. 
23 Meaning, as antecedently. 
and the constitution and situation of mountains, or even only the 
organization of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, but if we rather make 
the systematic unity of nature entirely universal in relation to the idea of a 
highest intelligence. (CPR, A69l!B719) 
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The passage above confirms, firstly, that there is yet a greater unity which stands 
beyond the unity under the universal laws of nature in its mechanical application, and 
that higher unity is the unity in relation to the idea of a highest intelligence. Therefore, 
mechanical unity is not the most universal unity we can find in nature. Secondly, 
plants, animals, and even some other products of nature which carry with themselves a 
strong sense of purposiveness are not routinely taken as being unified under the 
mechanical laws of nature when teleology is not included. The structure and the 
organization of organized beings call for a higher concept of unity which stands 
beyond the unity under the mechanical laws of nature. [f we are to take organic nature 
as a member of the systematic unity of nature, we ought to open a room for the 
concept of purposiveness and teleology. And that is also one of the reasons of the 
inexplicability of organized beings which will be discussed next. 
I believe, contra Guyer, the inexplicability of organisms is in no way a new 
thing that shows up in the third Critique. We have seen in the first chapter that the 
same claim is made by Kant in his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Only Possible 
Argument; and I think it is also manifested here in the first Critique. 
Here, the organized being in question is the human being24 and it is explained 
in Kant's observation on the Doctrine of the Soul in the Paralogisms. Kant (CPR, 
A38 1) compares the doctrine of soul with the doctrine of bodies; the former being the 
physiology of inner sense, the latter the physiology of the object of outer sense. 
24 I will explain the difference between human being and other living beings later in this 
chapter. 
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According to Kant (CPR, A381), as far as we are concerned with the inner sense that 
has only time as the form of its intuition, nothing can be found abiding in it 
empirically and, therefore, it stands beyond the realm of possible experience. Yet the 
existence of the soul as our thinking self is far beyond refutation? 5 He explains his 
standpoint on the soul by investigating three questions about: 1) the possibility of the 
community of the soul with an organic body 2) about the beginning of this community 
and 3) as to the end of the community. Concerning the first question, Kant takes the 
community of soul and body as "the animality" of human being which is at the same 
time "the state of the soul in the life of human being" (CPR, A384). And then he takes 
the community of thinking and extended beings as "life" (CPR, A393). That is not a 
new definition at all in the history of philosophy and it was pretty common in Kant's 
time too among philosophers, but the way he talks about such a community is original. 
Kant mentions three theories about the community of soul and body, and 
refutes all of them in part or in their entirety. These theories- or "usual systems" as he 
refers to them- are that of physical influence, pre-established harmony, and of 
supernatural assistance. The system of physical influence, a Cartesian theory being 
held by Wolff in Rational Psychology (1734), implies that mind and body are in a 
causal relation and can influence each other by their natural powers (CPR, A383; 
Guyer and Wood, CPR, 740). The system of pre-established harmony is the 
Leibnizian solution to the mind-body problem and indicates that although mind and 
body are subject to their own distinct laws, but they are harmonized by God's choice 
in the most perfect, possible way. And finally, the system of supernatural assistance is 
25 The main intention of confirming the existence of the soul is to secure "our thinking Self 
from the danger of materialism"(CPR, A383). 
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a theory introduced by Malebranche in his On the Search for Truth (1675). This 
theory denies that mind and body have any natural power, and takes God's causality as 
a mediatory element through which mind and body can influence one another (Guyer 
and Wood, CPR, 740). 
Kant (CPR, A390) takes the last two systems as being grounded on objections 
to the system of physical influence. Said objections are aimed at the heterogeneity of 
matter and its representations: matter as physical object cannot be the cause of 
representations in our mind because matter and representations are two entirely 
different species. Only the material can be caused by matter; a claim based on the 
logical principle of the homogeneity of cause and effect. 
According to Kant, the systems of pre-established harmony and supernatural 
assistance are dogmatic solutions to a dogmatic objection, to the system of physical 
influence; an objection which is not legitimate. The objection as mentioned above 
takes matter as an independent, in-itself substance which is the external object of 
representation, and thus finds it problematic for matter to be the cause of 
representations. Kant rejects such a presupposition since it makes a claim beyond the 
realm of possible experience, namely, that matter is more than just appearance. Once 
matter is taken as the external object of representations and not just as an appearance, 
then, no synthetic proposition a priori can be made about it because matter taken as 
noumenon is beyond the reach of possible experience. 
If we take matter as mere appearance of whatever substance we do not know, 
then it would not be problematic to see it in a causal relation with representations. The 
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system of physical influence does not necessarily make a dogmatic claim about mind-
body connection, thus no dogmatic objection can be made against it: 
.. . for if the opponent assumes that matter and its motion are mere 
appearances and thus themselves only representations, then he can place 
the difficulty only in the fact that the unknown object of our sensibility 
could not be the cause of representations in us; a claim, however, for 
which he has not the least justification. (CPR, A392) 
However, it does not indicate at all that Kant agrees with his teacher, Knutzen and 
Wolff on their version of the system of physical influence. 26 According to Kant (CPR, 
A392), although no dogmatic objection can be made against the theory of physical 
influence, "a well-grounded critical objection" is still valid against it. This critical 
objection is no different from Kant's objection against the other two systems of mind-
body relation as explained above. The same wrong presupposition is held by the 
theory of physical influence, namely to take material (extended) substances as things 
subsisting for themselves as opposed to being "mere representations of the thinking 
subject" (CPR, A392). Thus, all three theories of mind-body relation are suffering 
from a presupposition which says too much about matter. All of them take matter as 
noumenal and independent from representation, and therefore, face the problem of 
connecting them together in a causal relation. Such a claim about matter is a dogmatic 
claim, and thus, cannot lead to any legitimate conclusion. 
In order to avoid that mistake which is grounded on "crude dualism" (CPR, 
A392), Kant (CPR, A393) revises the mind-body problem in the following form: 
"how is outer intuition--namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and motion)--
possible at all in thinking subj ect?" It is quite fascinating that such a revision is not 
26 See also Inaugural Dissertation, Section IV. 
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being made at all for the sake of offering a better solution to the problem. Quite the 
opposite; it makes the problem insoluble: "it is not possible for any human being to 
find an answer to this question" (CPR, A393). All that may be done is to ascribe outer 
appearances to a transcendental object as the cause of representations. However, that 
cause itself is in its noumenality beyond the reach of our knowledge. No valid 
synthetic proposition a priori can be made about the thinking being, because, the 
subject in its subjectivity belongs to the realm of noumena. Also, no experience will 
be possible of the quality of existence of the thinking self, because the subject is 
separated from extension (space) by definition (CPR, B410): the realm of experience 
requires both time and space. 
By the same token, the other two questions mentioned above concerning the 
state of the soul before and after its community with extended substance, i.e. before 
and after life, cannot be answered by pure speculative reason. Because once the soul is 
divorced from corporeal nature, even its existence cannot be posited with a legitimate 
ground. By eliminating corporeality, experience becomes annihilated, and thus, no 
judgment can be made in the form of synthetic proposition a priori by pure 
speculative reason. 
Inexplicability of organized beings other than human beings can be explained 
by the same logic: if an organized being as living being manifests the communitl7 of 
soul and body, and if any investigation of the soul demands ascending from possible 
experience, then it would be impossible to explain organized beings in their entirety. 
If that claim is true, then Guyer's conflict28 is at least problematic, because even in 
27 Everywhere used only problematically. 
28 See page 36. 
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CPR organized beings-so far as they have bodies and souls- are not taken as 
explicable, in so far as pure speculative reason is concerned. 
According to Kant's definition of animality it could be shown with some 
certainty that although any living being other than the human being does not have a 
thinking self, it does have a soul (anima). Soul as anima is the principle of life in 
matter and the ground of animality (CPR, A345/B403). That principle in the case of 
human beings is the thinking substance. However, according to Kant, animality in 
general is nothing but the community of soul and body, i.e. life. The main difference 
between animal and human soul lies in the concept of rationality. Both animal and 
human souls provide the power of choice, with the difference that, the animal's power 
of choice is determined by sensible impulses, while the human soul, because of its 
intelligible character, makes it possible for her to be free from pathological 
determinations. Yet both animals and human beings have the capacity to originate 
action from an inner principle. 
In his discussion about causality in the Resolutions of Antinomies of CPR, 
Kant distinguishes between two types of causality: according to nature, and from 
freedom. Causality according to nature refers to "the connection of a state with a 
preceding one in the world of sense upon which that state follows according to a rule" 
(CPR, A532/B560). This is the type of causality science and pure speculative reason 
are mainly concerned with: a mechanical causality in the physical world. 
In opposition to natural causality, there is the causality from freedom which is 
the capacity of a substance to begin a state "from itself' '. According to Kant, freedom 
in this sense is an a priori idea of reason which is arisen from the concept of causality 
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itself: if whatever happens needs a cause, then the causality of the cause in general 
must have a cause too. In order to solve this difficulty it is necessary for reason to 
"create the idea of spontaneity, which could start to act from itself' (CPR, 
A533/B561 ) . Freedom in this sense is called the transcendental idea of freedom. 
Under the transcendental idea of freedom is grounded the practical idea of freedom 
which is "the independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of 
sensibility" (CPR, A534/B562). Transcendental freedom is the capacity of a substance 
to originate action from its noumenal existence, and is the ground of the possibility of 
practical freedom. 
The following passage supports my interpretation of the status of soul m 
human being and animals and shows its relation to the concept of freedom as 
explained above: 
... a power of choice is sensible insofar as it is pathologically affected 
(through moving causes of sensibility); it is called an animal power of 
choice (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated. The 
human power of choice is indeed an arbitriwn sensitivum, yet not brutum, 
but libertum, but in the human being there is a faculty of determining 
oneself from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible impulses. 
(CPR, A534/B562) 
Therefore, animal soul only provides a power of choice which is not practically free. 
The same point is also explained in The Metaphysics of Morals (MM): "that choice 
which can be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That which can be 
determined only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice 
(arbitrium brutum)" (MM, 6:2 14). Human choice, although it can be affected by the 
sensible impulses, is not necessarily determined by them, i.e. it is a free choice. 
Therefore, both human beings and animals as living beings are involved 
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(problematically) with a soul, which is the capacity to act on an inner state, namely, to 
have the power of choice. And they differ from each other because of the fact that the 
human being's power of choice is not necessitated by pathological inclinations, while 
the animal's is. 
The difference between the life of human being and of animals is indicated by 
the concepts of transcendental and practical freedom, but what is the difference 
between animal life and lifeless nature if both are subject to the necessary laws of 
nature? The problem is, if living beings other than human beings are not free, and are 
thus subject to the laws of nature, then what makes them any different from dead 
nature? In other words, what is the principle of life which is common in human beings 
and other living beings? 
An early answer to that question can be found in Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science (MF). In the section, Metaphysical Foundations of Mechanics, Kant 
(MM, 544) defines life as follows: "Life means the capacity of a substance to 
determine itself to act from an internal principle." This internal principle in a 
substance to change is called "desire". A similar definition is also made in the CPR of 
life and its connection to the faculty of desire: 
The causality of representations of a being in respect of the objects of them 
is life. The determinability of the power of representation to this causality 
is the faculty of desire. This power of representation, if it is reason, hence 
is the determinability of its causality in respect of objects, i.e. , its faculty 
of desire [is] will. If pure reason has causality, then the will is a pure will, 
and its causality is called freedom. (CPR, A538/B566) 
Therefore, the difference between a living being in general and lifeless matter is its 
capacity to act on desire. If we apply this understanding of life in what we have seen 
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before in CPR and MM about the difference between human and animal life we can 
arrive at a very interesting conclusion. There is, on the one hand, the animal power of 
choice which can only be determined by desire, and on the other hand, there is the 
human power of choice which goes beyond desire and can be determined by pure 
reason and by the means of the power of will. There is a state of natural necessity 
which belongs to the lifeless matter, and there is a realm of practical freedom that is 
the state of human moral life, and in the middle, there is the animal (life) that although 
acting on an internal principle, is necessitated by the outer world influencing that 
internal principle. 
The fact that the animal's action is necessitated by sensible impulses through 
the faculty of desire, must not mislead us to claim that therefore, they are 
mechanically explicable. On the contrary, it makes their mechanical inexplicability 
even more profound. As Kant asserts in MF, the cause of any change of matter in life, 
must be sought in a substance outside matter! Therefore, although the animal power of 
choice is not free from external inclinations, and is even determined by them, it is still 
free from matter, i.e. is outside of it, and is yet inside the organization of the animal as 
organized/living being. In other words, sensible impulses are able to determine a 
change in animals only by the mediation of the faculty of desire. And the internal 
principle of desire is ultimately the cause of the action and not the external impulse. If 
that internal principle must be sought outside matter, then it is immaterial and 
therefore does not necessarily obey the laws of mechanics in its internal causality., 
although its action is subject to those laws once it happens in the realm of appearance. 
Therefore, a living being remains inexplicable by the laws of mechanics because it 
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consists of a principle the causality of which stands beyond the reach of possible 
experience due to its immateriality. 
Guyer's conflict of the incompatibility of the unity of nature with the 
inexplicability of organized beings can be challenged by emphasizing the two 
following points: one, the concept of unity, and two, the inexplicability of living 
beings. Regarding the former, the mechanical unity of nature is not the ultimate 
universal unity that could be found in nature; yet a more universal unity is 
recognizable which includes both the technique and the mechanism of nature. In this 
way, the laws of the technique and the mechanism of nature are unified under the idea 
of the highest intelligence. Therefore, the universal unity of nature does not 
necessitate a mechanical reduction of all the products of nature, especially the ones 
that manifest a purposive causality, i.e. organized beings. 
In respect to the second point, the inexplicability of organized beings is also 
explained based on their living character, which is the capacity to initiate action from 
an inner principle. In this way, the principle of life calls for a kind of causality that 
allows for freedom and contingency. Such a contingent concept of causality (carefully 
used) is not reducible to the necessary mechanical laws of nature, and requires a 
concept of teleology in its explanation. 
So, I believe it is possible to find room for organized/living beings in the first 
Critique as inexplicable products of nature which go beyond mechanical explanations 
due to the contingency of their inner causality and the presence of the immaterial 
principle of life in their existence. This is not to say that the project of CPR is to 
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elaborate such a peculiarity in the system, or to posit it in a precious place within it: 
this task is yet to be started in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
Conclusion: 
With focus on CPR, MF, and MM, three aspects of the concepts of organized 
being and life are mainly being explained in this chapter: the meaning of systematic 
unity under a concept and its implications, inexplicability of organized beings by 
mechanical laws, and the meaning of life. Organized beings insofar as they are 
material bodies, are subject to the laws of nature, but as soon as we take them as living 
beings, they include (problematically used) in their existence the immaterial principle 
of life, and so, go beyond the limits of possible experience. However, no synthetic 
proposition a priori can be made about the community of the two. Thus, l(fe remains 
to be an undeniable, yet impenetrable, mystery. 
fn the case of human life, the principle of life is related to pure reason and the 
power of will, which provides the human being with transcendental freedom. 
However, in the case of living beings other than human beings, the principle of life is 
the capacity to act on desire, whereas the faculty of desire itself is practically 
determined by sensible impulses. 
The mind-body problem of the pre-Critical works has developed into the 
problem of unity-multiplicity and system-freedom in the first Critique. However, in 
our discussion about CPR, we saw only a small manifestation of these problems in 
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Kant's philosophy. He shows in the CPR a tendency to get away with the side of 
freedom by emphasizing on unity and systematicty, although, as I showed, he never 
entirely does that. As we move on to the next chapter, which focuses mainly on the 
third Critique, we will see that freedom, purposiveness, and the technique of nature 
play more important roles in Kant's philosophy than they are given in his CPR. As a 
result, the principle of life, as the faculty of spontaneity and freedom, becomes more 
and more significant and central to his philosophy. 
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Chapter three: 
Critique of the Power of Judgment: Organized and Living, System 
and Freedom, All and Nothing! 
Introduction: 
In the prevtous chapter, by analyzing the concept of unity in its different 
applications in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), we investigated some of the 
characteristics of the systematic unity of organized beings and their mechanical 
inexplicability due to their immaterial living character. Here, in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment (CPJ), another aspect of such a unity is emphasized which is the 
internal purposiveness of the systematic unity of organized beings. Purposiveness was 
taken in CPR mainly as a highest external teleological concept that is the ground of 
the existence of the systematic unity of reason and nature. However, the principle of 
purposiveness is introduced and developed differently in the third Critique. As we see 
in the First Introduction (FI) to CP J, the main difference between the accounts of 
purposiveness in CPR and in CPJ is the rise of the principle of purposiveness from the 
reflecting power of judgment, and not from pure reason. 
I would like to have a further look at Kant's account of purposiveness in the 
first Critique, focusing on its relation to teleology and the unity of reason in order to 
show how it results in a gap between teleology and mechanism, and also between pure 
reason and nature. Then, I will explain Kant's solution in CP J to the problem of the 
said gaps by providing an overview of his main accounts in CP J and by comparing the 
principle of purposiveness of the first Critique with the one manifested in the third 
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Critique. After, I shall have a look at the concept of inexplicability of organized 
beings, and its different implications. In the end, I will link the inexplicability of 
organized beings and their peculiar internal purposiveness with the concept of life as it 
is manifested in CP J, and very briefly, as it shows up in Kant's other works such as 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MF) and the Opus Postumum (OP). 
I will argue that the inexplicability of organized beings is a result of the 
presence of the principle of life in their existence as an immaterial element. 
Furthermore, I wi ll show that the internal purposiveness of organized beings 
combined with their immaterial living character, allows them to be a product of both 
the mechanism and the technique of nature. Thus, living beings play a mediatory role 
between mechanism and teleology, system and freedom, and shape their own 
metaphysical status. 
In the Paralogism of Pure Reason, while explaining the human being as end in 
itself, Kant makes the following analogy between living beings and the human being: 
By analogy with the nature of living beings in this world, regarding which 
reason must assume as a necessary principle that no organ, no faculty, 
nothing superfluous, or disproportionate to its use, hence nothing 
purposeless is to be met with, but rather that everything is to be judged as 
precisely suitable to its function in life, the human being, who alone can 
contain within himself the ultimate final end of all this, would have to be 
the only creature excepted from it. (CPR, 8425) 
Two different types of purposiveness are implicitly mentioned in this passage: internal 
and external purposiveness. The former refers to the inner purposive interconnection 
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of the different organs of an organized being, and the latter is the fruitfulness of some 
properties of nature to some other ones. As we see in the analogy above, the two types 
of purposiveness are not distinguished from each other, although one type depends on 
the other. In the external application of the principle of purposiveness, the human 
being as end in itself is explained. According to the external concept of purposiveness, 
every species exists for the sake of another, except for the human being who has its 
end in its own existence. For example, plants exist for the animals to survive, and 
animals exist to nourish human beings. However, the human being is not a means like 
plants and animals for other species in nature; it is, rather, the end of its own existence. 
The external purposiveness is rooted in the internal one; but this dependence is not 
explained in detail in CPR, as it is in the third Critique. 
The principle of external purposiveness is also explained in CPR through the 
idea of God as a supreme reason which is the source and origin of all things in their 
systematic connection: 
This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the 
purposive unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it 
necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the 
purpose of a supreme reason. (CPR, A686/B714) 
In this way, purposive unity as the highest unity is understood as formal and 
originating from a supreme reason, and is a result of the speculative interest of reason. 
Moreover, the purpose of nature and of the world as a whole is situated in a being 
outside of nature. Although based on the analogy with organized being, purpose has to 
be inside the entirety of the organized being itself; this distinction is not something 
that is elaborated upon in CPR. 
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A merely formal or transcendental unity, although providing a good support 
for the idea of God, cannot provide a satisfactory ground for the idea of purposiveness 
of nature in its organic products: the organic nature manifests the purpose in its own 
organization (though its purposiveness is not limited to its mechanism). Thus, the 
purposiveness derived from formal unity of reason cannot explain the internal 
purposiveness of the living nature because it puts the purpose outside of it. There is a 
gap between what the speculative reason takes as the telos, and what the organic 
nature manifests as its internal purposiveness. This is to say, there is gap between 
reason and nature in its organized products: an unexpected gap between the unity of 
reason and of nature. The problem of the gap is specifically crucial once the organized 
products of nature are taken under consideration. 
The separation of purpose from the organized being leaves us with two 
problems: on the one hand, positing the purpose within the mechanism of nature 
implies a totally mechanistic interpretation of organic nature which is precisely what 
Kant does not want to confirm for various reasons; and on the other hand, locating the 
purpose outside the system of nature does not explain the inner contingent 
systematicity and reciprocal relation of the organization of organized beings, and 
deepens the gap between the technique and the mechanics of nature. The purpose 
cannot be explained by merely mechanical laws because it belongs to teleology, i.e. to 
causality from freedom. The purpose cannot be totally taken away from the living 
nature, because it is supposed to explain its organic systematicity and to secure the 
contingency of its specific laws. 
To avoid the said problem Kant gives the following account of teleology in the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic: 
Such a principle [purposiveness]29 opens out to our reason, as applied in 
the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the 
world may be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it 
to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assumption of a supreme 
intelligence ... can therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it. 
Thus, if in studying the shape of mountains ... etc., we assume it to be the 
outcome of wise purpose on the part of an Author .. . , we are enabled to 
make in this way a number of discoveries .... even error cannot do us any 
serious harm. For the worst that can happen would be that where we 
expected a teleological connection (nexus finalis) , we find only a 
mechanical or physical connection (nexus effectivus) . ln such a case, we 
merely fail to find the additional unity .. . (CPR, A687/ B715) 
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As stated in the passage above, it is by a teleological connection that nature as 
mechanism is supposed to be related to its end, i.e. to its purpose, which is still 
external to it. However, here, the teleological side of the purpose has only a secondary 
importance and plays no significant role in the empirical explanation of nature: it is 
just an additional unity which could be given to the system or not. For example, when 
a basketball player throws the ball to score; her intention to score is the telos behind 
the ball's motion towards the basket, but that intention should not be considered by a 
scientist who is studying the aerodynamics of the ball's motion towards the basket. 
Therefore, what Kant suggests here is for science to study nature as if it works 
towards a purpose and not be worried about the purpose itself. In this way, the 
regulativity of the principle of purposiveness is being seen as convincing enough to 
shrink from solving the problem of the gap between teleology and mechanism. 
However, apparently the above solution is not convincing because the scientist 
can never explain the generation of the ball's motion towards the basket merely by the 
laws of aerodynamics: there would be no motion at all if there was not an intention to 
score. Moreover, if the scientist searches in the basketball player's body and its 
29 Added by me. 
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mechanical motions for the explanation of the generation of the motion of the ball, he 
will have no chance to succeed, because no law of mechanics determines the player's 
body to throw the ball: the intention cannot be eliminated anymore. That is to say, 
there is a gap between the laws of mechanics (manifesting necessity, lawfulness and 
systematicity) and teleology (manifesting freedom, contingency and purposiveness) 
that prevents the scientist from reaching a satisfactory explanation. One way to 
explain nature is to reduce all of its contents to necessary laws of mechanism, and 
another way is to reduce everything to the contingency of the laws and ends of God. 
There is a battle between a mechanistic and a teleological point of view, and neither 
by itself will satisfy Kant. Explanations based solely on teleology do not satisfy him 
because they demolish the necessity of empirical laws of nature. Mechanical 
explanations do not satisfy him because they reduce all contingencies to mechanical 
necessity and so leave no room for freedom, i.e. for purposiveness. 
The gap between the technique and the mechanics of nature cannot be fi lled 
by pure reason itself; actually, the main issue underlying the problem of the gap is the 
central role of pure reason. On the one hand, it is pure reason30 which provides the 
universal laws of nature, and it is again the pure reason that makes for itself the a 
priori principles of purposiveness and teleology. On the other hand, nature, 
specifically in its organized products, manifests a contingency that cannot be 
explained by those a priori laws. The mechanical laws of nature do not allow such 
contingencies, and the teleological laws, since they put the telos outside the system of 
nature, do not explain the contingency of the inner causality of its organized products. 
Thus, there is a gap not only between teleology and mechanism, but also between pure 
30 As understanding. 
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reason and nature in empiricality. This problem is partly a result of the fact that Kant's 
concern here is not the systematicity of empirical knowledge in its empericality, but 
the systematicity of reason which is granted to be the unity of nature: "The unity of 
reason is the unity of system ... " (CPR, A680/B708). Although Kant tries to expand 
this systematic unity to the realm of the empirical, this expansion takes place only 
from, and through, the systematic unity of pure reason itself. The problem becomes 
more crucial when lack of empiricality begins to threaten the validity of the rational 
systematicity of nature, and thus, questions the usefulness of the principle of 
purposiveness even for the use of explanation. Excluding empirical laws of nature 
from the systematic unity leaves the rational purposiveness of nature without any 
objective (i.e. empirical) support whatsoever. 
Kant himself provides a version of the gap problem in CP J: 
We have seen in the critique of pure reason that the whole of nature as 
the totality of all objects of experience constitutes a system in accordance 
with transcendental laws, namely those that the understanding itself gives 
a priori ... . For that very reason, experience, in accordance with general 
as well as particular laws, insofar as it is considered objectively to be 
possible in general, must also constitute (in the idea) a system of possible 
empirical cognitions. (FI, 20:209) 
The systematic unity of reason also needs to be applied in empiricality. In Kant's 
account of the unity in CPR, although purposiveness is considered as a transcendental 
element necessary to the systematic unity, it is as yet taken as a principle of pure 
reason, and as external to nature's organization. 
However, in CP J , Kant rev1ses his account of purposiveness, and also of 
cognition in order to offer a solution to the problem(s) of the gap(s). One of the first 
moves he makes in order to fill that gap is to introduce the faculty of judgment as the 
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mediator between universal laws of nature g1ven by understanding, and the 
multiplicity of the particular-empirical systems of nature. In this way, the power of 
judgment provides the minor premise through which a particular empirical proposition 
can be resulted by the act of subsumption under a universal (FI, 20: 214-15). I will 
briefly give an overview of CP J before I explain Kant's solution to the gap problem. 
In his introductions to CP J, Kant distinguishes, as he also does in the first 
Critique, between three faculties of the human mind, namely, those of cognition, 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and desire. Understanding, as shown in the first 
Critique, provides a priori principles for the faculty of cognition; (pure practical) 
reason, as shown in the second Critique, gives a priori concepts to the faculty of 
desire in the form of moral laws; and now, in the third Critique, the faculty of 
judgment is (hypothetically) taken as responsible for providing (not producing) the 
faculty of pleasure and displeasure with a priori concepts. 
The next important move taken in the introductions is to introduce the 
reflecting power of judgment as opposed to the determining one. The "power of 
judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the 
universal" (CPJ, 5: 179). The determining power of judgment "is an underlying 
concept through a given empirical representation" (FI, 20:2 11 ). In other words, the 
determining power of judgment does not produce any universal concepts or laws; 
rather, it only subsumes the particular under a given universal. The reflecting power of 
judgment, on the other hand, is "a mere faculty for reflecting on a representation, in 
accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made 
possible" (FI, 20:211); meaning that, the only thing given is the particular, and the 
reflecting power of judgment is responsible for finding a universal under which the 
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particular could be subsumed. The particulars Kant is speaking of here are mainly of 
two types: objects of aesthetic judgment, and organized products of nature. In the case 
of organized beings, the universal concept the reflecting power of judgment is looking 
for is the internal purposiveness of the organized products of nature, while in the case 
of aesthetic judgment, the universal is only a matter of "agreement" or a kind of 
intersubjective concurrence (CPJ, 5: 194). 
The aesthetic judgment is divided by Kant into two categories: judgment on 
the beautiful, and judgment on the sublime, and they are discussed in the book under 
the two divisions of the first part. Likewise, the second part of the book, Critique of 
the Teleological Power of Judgment, which considers the organized products of nature 
from the perspective of their purposiveness, is divided into two main divisions of 
Analytic and Dialectic, followed by a Methodology as the appendix. The aesthetic 
power of judgment is "the faculty for judging formal purposiveness (also called 
subjective) through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure", and the teleological one is 
"the faculty for judging the real purposiveness (objective) of nature through 
understanding and reason" (CPJ, 5:1 93). Since the focus of the present chapter of the 
thesis is on the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, I shall briefly explain 
the first part of CP J on aesthetic judgment, and then move on to the second part. 
As mentioned, the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment consists of an 
Analytic and a Dialectic section as well as a mediating discussion on the Deduction of 
Pure Aesthetic Judgment and an appendix on Methodology of Taste. The analytic 
section itself consists of two books: Analytic of the Beaut(fitl and of the Sublime. The 
Analytic of the Beaut(ful is shaped under four "moments" of quality, quantity, relation 
and modality (similar to the forms of judgment in the Transcendental Analy tic of 
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CPR). The disinterestedness of the aesthetic judgment is explained under the fi rst 
moment. The subjective universality of the judgments of taste and the free play of 
imagination and understanding as the source of pleasure in beauty, are the main 
themes of the moment of quantity. The moment of relation discusses the formal 
purposiveness of the beautiful as well as the distinction between free beauty (beauty 
without a concept of purpose) and adherent beauty (beauty from the coherence of 
form of an object with its purpose). The mentioned relation also introduces human 
morality as the ideal of beauty. Modality, the last moment of the Analytic of Beautifzt!, 
emphasizes again the universal validity of the judgments of taste, and also introduces 
the concept of inspiration as opposed to imitation. 
In the Analytic of the Sublime, the moments of quantity and quality are 
explained under division of the mathematical sublime; the moments of relation and 
modality are described under the dynamical concept of the sublime. The former takes 
place when the vastness and greatness of a phenomenon (due to its formlessness, as 
opposed to the beautiful) ascends our ability to take it as a single whole and gives rise 
to feelings of frustration and then of pleasure: frustration of our inability to grasp its 
totality, and pleasure in realizing that the fact that we try to imagine the sublime as a 
whole is in harmony with the unifying tendency of our reason. The dynamical sublime 
is again a vast and great phenomenon that, this time, makes us realize our physical 
inability and weakness towards it. However, the human morality is our asset and 
remains safe from the greatness of the dynamical sublime. Thus, again, there is a 
feeling of pleasure as well as a feel ing of displeasure, both mixed together. Both the 
mathematical and the dynamical sublime are related to morality, teleology and 
theology. 
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The Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments-besides arguing for the universal 
validity of the judgment of taste, and relating it to morality and theology- contains 
Kant's discussion about the fine arts. He distinguishes between nature, handicraft, 
natural science and fine arts. The latter is a product of genius and produces a free play 
between imagination, understanding and reason. 
The antinomy between the universality and individuality of the judgment of 
taste as well as its resolution is the main theme of the Dialectic section. In this way, 
Kant maintains a supersensible substratum which contains both the human being and 
nature (in general), and which makes universality and harmony between them 
possible. The relation between the free play in aesthetic and moral freedom is also 
discussed, both here and in the Methodology of Taste, but in two different ways. Here, 
in the Dialectic Kant goes from aesthetics to morality, but in the Methodology he 
begins with morality and makes a move to aesthetics. 
The Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, as mentioned above, 
consists of an Analytic, a Dialectic and a Methodology. The analytic part is focused on 
the concept of purposiveness in organized beings. There are two concepts of 
purposiveness: external (relative) and internal. The external concept of purposiveness 
refers to the subjective purposiveness based on the fruitfulness of an organized being 
for other ones. The internal purposiveness of organized beings, on the other hand, 
refers to the inner reciprocal interconnection between the organs of an organized 
being (i.e. the fact that the parts are at the same time causes and effects of one 
another) and their relation to the organized being as a whole. The internal (objective) 
purposiveness is the one which is important in our discussion. 
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According to Kant, the inner reciprocal causality of the organized being in tum 
makes us presuppose a more general concept of teleology, as if such an internal 
harmony and purposiveness would not be possible without having a designer who 
made that harmony possible. Then, Kant returns to the concept of relative 
purposiveness and tries to justify the validity of it by using the concept of internal 
purposiveness and the concept of a designer (God). If there is a designer, then there 
must be a purpose for his design; and it is due to this purposeful design that the 
relative purposiveness is meaningful (CPJ, §67). 
The Dialectic is built upon an antinomy between two positions: "all generation 
of material things" is explainable by mechanical laws, versus the proposition that 
asserts some generations are inexplicable by mechanical laws. In order to find a 
solution to this antinomy, Kant uses a distinction between the regulative and 
constitutive principles of the reflecting judgment. Regulative principles do not make 
claims to actuality; the constitutive principles do. Kant claims that if we take the two 
positions above only as regulative maxims, then there will be no contradiction 
between them, because we can blame the inexplicability of organized beings on the 
limitedness of our reason in its mechanical explanations, and not to the organized 
beings in their actuality as natural beings in their noumenality.31 Moreover, since the 
cause of the limitedness of mechanical explanations cannot be derived from nature 
itself (because if nature is mechanical in actuality, it must allow mechanical 
explanations), it is taken as a result of the mechanism of nature being subordinated to 
31 This overview in general, and this paragraph specifically, gives only a standard Guyer-
based reading of the text. Some of this reading will eventually be challenged in this chapter. 
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teleology, and being only a means through which the ends of God are actualized. 
Therefore, organized beings represent two ranks of laws: mechanical and teleological. 
The appendix to the second part of the book, i.e. the Methodology is an 
account of the implications and limitations of teleology in its uses for explaining 
nature and (through the concept of morality) for theology. Natural purposiveness of 
organized beings, as well as the inexplicability of the generation of life in those 
beings, point to a designer as the highest intelligence beyond nature (as a universal 
whole). From that remark, combined with the moral capacity of human beings, Kant 
concludes that the human being is the end of nature. The rest of the Methodology is 
devoted to deriving from this the "kingdom of ends", the concept of happiness, and 
eventually the concept of highest good which shapes a moral argument in favor of the 
existence of God. 
As we saw in the overview, at least two different types of puposiveness are 
recognized in CPJ32 : determinate (external), and indeterminate (internal). When 
something is product of a design, i.e. is a product of art,33 the purposiveness attributed 
to its causality is subj ective, determinate and intentional. In this way purpose is 
chosen and presented intentionally by an artificer. On the other hand, the internal 
purposiveness of nature is objective and is related to the purposiveness brought up by 
the reflecting power of judgment in order to unify the contingent multiplicity of 
32 As Hannah Gins borg ( 1997, 330) suggests, those two types could be united under a more 
general conceptualization of the concept of puposiveness, so the concept of God does not need 
to be rejected as the highest unity and the highest principle of teleology. 
33 
"Art" is used here to refer to any product that has its purpose external to it (e.g. as it is used 
by Kant in §65 of CP J) and not as it is employed in the Aesthetic Judgment. 
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organic nature.34 Internal purposiveness is a result of considering the peculiar inner 
causality in the organization of organized beings. 35 
We need a concept of purposiveness that fulfills three functions: to unify the 
manifold under a concept, to provide a final causality, and to preserve the organized 
being as a product of nature. In order to achieve the first, the purpose needs to be an 
34 Here, nothing intentional or determining could be attributed to organized being as the 
product of nature because this type of purposiveness is only regulative; although as Allison 
(1990, 36) truly suggests, it is still a transcendental principle of the refl ecting power of 
judgment. 
35 The external purposiveness is dependent upon the internal one: as Kant states, without 
supposing a final cause within the constitution of organized being we are not able to grasp any 
unity from the manifoldness of organic nature. Without such purposiveness, nature would be 
extremely contingent in its causality according to its organic products: 
in order for us to be able at least to conceive of the possibility of such an 
agreement of the things of nature with the power of judgment (which we 
represent as contingent, hence as possible only through an end aimed at it), we 
must at the same time conceive of another understanding, in relation to which, 
and indeed prior to any end attributed to it, we can represent that agreement of 
natural laws with our power of judgment, which for our understanding is 
conceivable only through ends as the means of connection, as necessary. (CPJ, 
5:407) 
Here again, as we saw in the New Elucidation, it is not even for the sake of explanation that 
we need to presuppose teleology; before that, the very possibility of even conceiving such a 
uni ty within the contingency of organic nature demands it. In this way, the elaborate harmony 
and the purposiveness of the inner causality of organized nature necessitates that we 
presuppose a higher concept of teleology which makes them possible. This is, moreover, an 
argument to support the holistic character of organized being: without a purpose which stands 
before and behind the multiplicity of the parts and is present in its inner interactions, an 
organized being would not be conceived as a systematic unity; it would rather be conceived as 
a mere aggregate of matter. For example, a piece of rock and the ocean do not shape a 
systematic unity objectively: they are piles of matter in no rec iprocal relation to each other 
and affect one another only under the necessary laws of nature. They do not form an organic 
unity because they are not in reciprocal connection and do not meet any purpose. And each of 
the two could be seen separately from the other and taken independently. On the other hand, 
eyes and fingers of an animal, for example, are both serving one purpose that is the being and 
the totality of the animal itself. They are differe nt parts of a whole: they are unified due to a 
single purpose, and their systematic unity is in turn a result of the whole. Fingers and eyes 
separated from the animal are only piles of dead matter. Without the purpose they are serving, 
and without the whole they are in reciprocal connection under, they are only aggregates of 
matter, i.e. are dead! We saw before, and we will see later, that matter is by definition lifeless. 
To be an aggregate of matter is equivalent of being a pile ofl ifeless extended substance. 
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idea or a concept in a reciprocal connection with its parts so it can form a whole out of 
the contingent multiplicity. To meet the second requirement, the principle of 
purposiveness needs to be a priori, and thus, to be necessary and universal. And to 
grasp the third, purposiveness as a principle of reflecting power of judgment must be 
objective (though being regulative) (CPJ, 5:376). 
In the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment as opposed to CPR, 
purposiveness comes from the power of judgment instead of pure reason, and thus, 
gets one step closer to empirical reality. And although purposiveness is still defined as 
unity under a concept, it is being defined from the point of view of the purposive 
being itself (as object of experience in the Kantian sense) and not solely from the 
transcendental perspective of pure reason (CPJ, 5:373). To say (regulatively) that 
(internal) purposiveness is a way of being of a natural entity is different from 
purifying purposiveness from anything related to the purposive being itself, that is to 
say, to define it based on a priori principles of pure speculative reason. For example, a 
blade of grass is itself an organic whole under the concept of which its different parts 
are unified; and is not just a mere aggregate of matter which has no internal purpose 
and is only unified under an external principle of teleology. The purposiveness 
brought up solely by pure reason is subjective and does not explain the internal 
purposiveness of organic nature: pure reason is too departed from objectivity to 
produce an objective internal purposiveness. 
We have seen in the last chapter that a logical and a transcendental sense is 
mentioned in CPR for systematic unity, and now another aspect of such a purposive 
unity is revealed. As John D. McFarland (1970, 40) puts it, there is a biological as 
well as a logical character to the concept of purposiveness of nature. There is a logical 
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system which provides the "idea" or the "concept" under which the manifold of the 
empirical could be unified. However, now, the idea is not alone in explaining the 
systematicity of nature in its organic products: the internal purposiveness is added to 
it. Purpose is not an idea of pure reason alone that makes nature logically 
comprehensible; it is, rather, a co-product of nature and the reflecting power of 
judgment. As Michael Friedman ( 1992, 186-7) explains, reflecting judgment is 
required to secure the systematicity of particular laws of nature. Purposiveness must 
show itself in nature too, and cannot be taken only as a principle of pure reason. In 
order to fill the gap between reason and nature, nature must get one step closer to our 
cognition. As Kant (FI, 20:216) puts it: "The special principle of the power of 
judgment is thus: Nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance 
with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment." Therefore, the 
power of judgment cannot justify the systematic unity of nature in its particular laws 
by itself, it needs a hand from nature! 
This is how an attempt is being made to fill the gap between teleology and 
mechanism: there is the idea on the one side and the mechanical systematicity on the 
other, and a special kind of natural product in the middle which can host both at the 
same time. The mediator cannot be a mere idea or an entirely material object, it needs 
to contain both of them at the same time. Such a mediator can only be an organized 
being, an organism, a living being. And this is what makes organized beings 
extraordinary and peculiar: they welcome system and freedom, concept and nature, 
immaterial and material all at the same time. 
Hannah Gins borg (200 1, 250) explains this peculiar purposiveness of nature 
under the concept of normativity. That is to say, the internal purposiveness of nature 
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regulatively refers to an "ought to be'' factor in the constitution of organized being; 
rather than being just an explanatory concept. This interpretation takes Kantian 
purposiveness closer to Aristotelian teleology with the crucial difference that in the 
former the purposive principle is only a regulative one, while in the latter it is 
constitutive and determining.36 A result of Ginsberg's interpretation, other than 
explaining the possibility of such a principle, is to refute a functionalist interpretation 
which takes the purposiveness of nature as a blind teleology of a blind mechanism. To 
be a purpose, as Ginsborg explains, is not just to have an end, but moreover to apply 
standards and norms based on which an organic product of nature is functioning 
according to a design. In this way, organized beings are mechanically inexplicable 
with respect to their origin and their end. While dead nature, i.e. the mechanism of 
nature, is strictly bound to the universal laws of matter and motion, and highly 
determined by the laws given by reason a priori, organic nature is highly contingent 
by its internal purposiveness and cannot be explained by mere mechanical laws. The 
contingency of organized beings is due to the multiplicity of nature in its 
specifications. Thus, unlike inorganic nature, living nature is not limited to mere 
mechanical laws of matter, but there is a formative character dwelling in it: organisms 
are self-organizing and they produce their forms by themselves (CPJ, 5:374). The 
formative character opens up a room for a systematic unity which can be shaped 
within the organized being itself (although the very capacity to originate forms is not 
possible in physical nature alone, and needs to be originated from a higher principle). 
36 Or, John Scott perfectly explained the similarity of Kantian account of purposiveness of 
natune with Aristotelian teleology in a Jockey Club session. I would like, if I may, to mention 
the difference between the two accounts while confirming Dr. Scott's point about their 
similarities. 
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The laws to which organized beings are bound, and the ways through which 
those laws could be applied to physical nature, are highly diverse and multiplied. The 
formative character is inherent in them and so is not graspable for our cognitive 
faculties. Even after considering organized beings as purposeful and united under a 
concept, they cannot yet be explained mechanically since the type of causality natural 
purposiveness operates within is not of an efficient one and thus not limited to the 
mechanism of nature. 37 
McFarland ( 1970, 3 7 -40) relates this mechanical inexplicability to the unifying 
character of the principle of purposiveness: if the highest unity is the purposive one, 
then nature cannot be explained mechanically, simply because the unifying element 
which is both the origin and the end of organized being is already put outside of the 
mechanism of nature. Ginsborg (2001 , 242) points to a similar reason for this matter; 
she believes that the inexplicability comes from the inaccessibility of origins to 
mechanical explanations. These interpretations are based on the conceptual and ideal 
character of the unifying element in the principle of purposiveness which takes the 
organized being further than being a product of the mere mechanism of nature. So, 
mechanical explanation is by definition accurate to explain the mechanical products of 
nature, while organisms are products of the technique (and the mechanism) of nature. 
37 It is true that such a principle of purposiveness is only heuristic and regulative, but it does 
not imply that the organism in question is purposeless. Rather, such a purposiveness is the 
ground of the possibility of the existence of organized being as such. If there is such a thing as 
living being, it cannot be a mere aggregate of matter (see the example of eyes and fingers 
above); and life, in turn, is the capacity to originate action from an inner principle. 
Furthennore, since to originate action is not possible without intentionality and purposiveness, 
a living being is not even imaginable without presupposing a concept of internal 
purposiveness in its organization. That is to say, as explained before, without the internal 
principle of purposiveness, an organic unity is not even conceivable. In the Kantian world, 
this is as objective as a principle can get. 
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The laws of mechanics are not concerned with any kind of causality which is not an 
efficient one. Therefore, as we saw in the last chapter, causality from freedom, which 
is the type of causality that operates by the technique of nature, is beyond the realm of 
mechanical explanation. Generation and the inner causality of the organized being are 
the result of the technique (and of the mechanic) of nature and so manifest causality 
from freedom. In other words, nexus .finalis, as opposed to nexus effectivus, is only 
possible through causality from freedom, and thus, is not mechanically explicable. 
Under the principle of internal purposiveness of nature, it is possible for 
organized being to be experienced empirically, and at the same time transcends 
scientific explanations in respect to its origin and its inner reciprocal causality. As 
Kant famously asserts: 
... one could investigate all the thus far known and yet to be discovered 
laws of mechanical generation in a thing that we must judge as an end of 
nature, and even hope to make good progress in this, without the appeal 
to a quite distinct generating ground for the possibility of such a product, 
. . . and absolutely no human reason (or even any finite reason that is 
similar to ours in quality, no matter how much it exceeds it in degree) can 
ever hope to understand the generation of even a little blade of grass from 
merely mechanical cause. (CPJ, 5:409) 
Therefore, inexplicability of the organized being is not a matter of lacking accurate 
empirical data about it, but is a result of the fimdamental insufficiency and limitedness 
of our powers and faculties of cognition. No limited reason can fully grasp this, 
because organized beings belong-in terms of their generation and their peculiar inner 
causality- to an unknowable realm. Thus, there will not be a Newton of a blade of 
grass who can explain its generation and inner causality by mere mechanical laws of 
nature (CPJ, 5:410). 
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In spite of the strong position that Kant expresses explicitly in respect to 
mechanical inexplicability of organized beings, Marcel Quarfood (2004, 156) suggests 
that molecular biology might be able to do the task of the Newton of the blade of 
grass. The force of his argument to support that claim is a passage from CP J where 
Kant says: 
. . . for us to judge in tum that even if we could penetrate to the principle 
of nature in the specification of its universal laws known to us there could 
lie hidden no ground sufficient for the possibility of organized beings 
without the assumption of an intention underlying their generation would 
be presumptuous: for how could we know that? (CPJ, 5:400) 
Based on this passage, Quarfood makes the conclusion that Kant's position on the 
question of generation is silence, or is a neutral one, and therefore, it is possible for 
science to offer a mechanical explanation as it develops in its investigations. Quarfood 
argues that it is problematic to claim that it is not possible to mechanically explain 
organized beings while it is possible for them to have a mechanical origin. Moreover, 
he believes that the amazing developments in biology have provided a broader sense 
for the concept of mechanism itself. Thus, Quarfood suggests that such an explanation 
might be possible in future, as science develops in understanding the origin of organic 
nature. 
First of all, I believe that Quarfood g1ves an at least problematic (if not 
wrong)38 reading of the passage in question. In the section Quarfood refers to (§75), 
based on the distinction between determining and reflecting principles, Kant 
emphasizes that the principle of purposiveness of nature is a principle of the reflecting 
38 I say wrong because a result of Quarfood's interpretation is to demolish all of Kant's ethics, 
politics, and theology. By subjecting the principle of life to mechanical laws there will remain 
no room for freedom, and without freedom, morality makes no sense whatsoever in a Kantian 
system. 
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power of judgment and thus is not determining. And by that he means, by the 
principle of purposiveness we do not ascribe anything to nature in its noumenality. 
The way in which our limited faculty of cognition and of reflecting power of judgment 
works makes it necessary for us to presuppose an intention as the ground of the 
possibility of organized nature,39 but it does not imply that there is an intelligent 
intending principle or being in organized nature in its noumenality. Therefore, he says, 
we cannot make this claim that even if we could penetrate into organized nature in its 
noumenality it would be impossible not to find a teleological or purposive principle; 
because how can we know by our limited reason what can be discovered in nature as 
noumenon? Thus, I believe, contra Quarfood, penetrating "to the principle of nature in 
the specification of its universal laws" is to penetrate to nature in its noumenality, and 
is beyond the reach of our knowledge, and so is never possible. Therefore, molecular 
biology could penetrate to every single cell and molecule existing in the universe, but 
it cannot penetrate nature's noumenality, and thus, cannot explain the generation of 
even a blade of grass. That passage is a conditional proposition the condition of which 
is impossible to be met by human or by any other limited reason.40 
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"this maxim of the reflecting power of judgment is essential for those products of nature 
which must be judged only as intentionally formed thus and not otherwise, in order to obtain 
even an experiential cognition of their internal constitution; because even the thought of them 
as organized things is impossible without associating the thought of a generation with an 
intention" (CPJ, 5:398). 
40 It is obvious that, according to Kant, nothing can be known in its noumenality, and so, one 
might claim that the inexplicability of organized being as explained above, is nothing more 
than inexplicability of noumena. However, that is not the case here: the point is not that we 
cannot know organized beings as objects in their noumenality; it is rather the fact that 
organized beings cannot be known in terms of their generation and their inner causality unless 
their connection to a noumenal element is understood; and since that is impossible to know, 
therefore they remain inexplicable. In the case of dead products of nature, we do not face any 
difficulty in explaining their causal relations by mechanical laws because their efficient 
causality does not presuppose any purposive connection to their noumenality; their relation to 
each other is explainable based on their phenomenal characteristics. However, in the case of 
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There is no doubt that Kant's position, as he explicitly asserts, is neither 
affirmative nor negative; but the crucial point is: why does he take that position? 
Kant's neutral position is a result of the inexplicability of organized beings, and is not 
a sign of its possibility to be explained. Kant's point is, since such a peculiar causality 
goes beyond the realm of possible experience, we cannot make any legitimate 
judgment about them, affirmative or negative. This is the standard standpoint of 
Critical philosophy about anything with that characteristic, i.e. about any dogmatic 
claim. 
DNA could be an example of what Quarfood is suggesting as the Newton of 
blade of grass. Is it possible to claim that DNA is what makes systematic unity 
possible in a living being? And is this a legitimate claim to say that DNA, or any 
biological element like DNA, explains the generation of living beings? I believe the 
answer to these questions, for Kant, is no, since the principle of life involved in 
organized beings is an immaterial element which cannot be generated from matter.4 1 
In this way, mechanism and life belong to two different realms fundamentally. The 
former belongs to matter and the lawfulness of the interactions imposed on it, while 
the latter belongs to purposiveness of nature and to the realm of freedom. 
Purposiveness means to be unified under a concept (whether the concept is ready at 
hand or not) and life is the possibility to act on desire, or on an internal principle: 
organized beings, we recognize a contingency in their inner causali ty which is a sign of 
"causality from freedom", i.e. a sign of purposiveness. And causality from freedom, as 
explained in the previous chapter, manifests an essential connection to noumenal realm. 
Therefore, to know the inner causality of an organized being is nothing but to know it in its 
noumenality, and thus is an impossible task to accomplish by our limited reason. 
41 Guyer (2005) also explains the inexplicability of organized beings due to the lifelessness of 
matter as opposed to the living character of organized beings. 
Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in the animals 
(the ground of which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans 
(of which we are immediately aware) we can quite properly infer in 
accordance with the analogy that the animals also act in accordance with 
representations (and are not, as Descartes would have it, machines), and 
that in spite of their specific difference, they are still of the same genus as 
human beings (as living beings). (CPJ 5:464) 
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As we see here, even animals act on representation and so they have the "living" 
element which takes them beyond mere mechanical laws of motion. There is a 
principle of spontaneity intermingled (problematically used) with organized beings 
that is the capacity to act on an inner principle. Therefore, organized beings are not 
mere machines; and Kant is actually quite explicit in asserting that: 
An organized being is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a motive 
power, while the organized being possesses in itself a formative power. .. , 
which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that 
is mechanism). (CPJ, 5:374) 
As mentioned before, the formative power refers to the capacity of organized being to 
form the matter by itself. In other words, organized beings can act and change based 
on their inner capacity. It means that they have a principle of spontaneity within 
themselves (CPJ, 5:410). 
Therefore, on the one hand, organized beings are self-organizing, i.e. they have 
the fom1ative power; and on the other hand--and connected to the former-- they have 
the capacity to act on an inner principle. These two along with their inscrutable inner 
causality, bring living beings beyond the reach of mechanical explanation. It is true 
that Kant makes a great attempt to make possible scientific understanding of 
organisms as objects of the outer senses, but at the same time, and more importantly, 
according to Guyer (2005, 314-42) and Kant himself, even a greater attempt has been 
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made to relate the organic nature to an immaterial supersensible element. Organized 
beings must have one foot in mechanical world and the other in the supersensible.42 
The principle of life in organized beings cannot be reduced to any physical 
causality we know of, and is essentially beyond the reach of our understanding. Guyer 
(2005, 355) provides a deeper explanation of this inexplicability by quoting CP J, 5: 
394, where Kant refutes hylozoism based on the contradictory claim it is bound to: 
"However, the possibility of a living matter (the concept of which contains a 
contradiction, because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes its essential characteristic), 
cannot even be conceived". Therefore, matter is by definition lifeless and any hope to 
explain a living being based on material laws is impossible. Mechanical laws of 
nature, as the laws of matter and its motion, are by definition unable to explain an 
organized being as a living being. 
A quick look at the passage below from the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science can support that remark: 
The mechanical law must alone be called the law of inertia .. . The inertia of 
matter is, and means, nothing else than its lifelessness, as matter in itself. 
Life is the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal 
principle, of a finite substance to change, and of a material substance [to 
determine itself] to motion or rest, as change of its state . .. Hence all 
matter, as such, is lifeless. (MF, 544) 
The claim of hylozoism is to posit the living element inside matter itself as a material 
element. Since the essential characteristic of matter is inertia or lifelessness, the 
42 Although such a dual character about the organized being is similar to the dual character of 
the human being in the Groundwork III, they are not the same. The moral agent of the 
Groundwork has a sensible and an intelligible character; the latter referring to the rational 
aspect of the human being. In the case of organized being in general, as I understand it, the 
intelligible character is replaced with the mere spontaneity of action, i.e. life. The rationality is 
missing, but the immateriality is maintained in the supersensible character of the 
organized/living being as the principle of life. 
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hylozoist notion of "living matter" cannot be meaningful and so cannot give us an 
explanation of the generation or inner causality of organized beings. As stated before, 
given that the mechanism of nature is nothing other than the laws of the motion of 
matter, a living being is by definition beyond the grasp of such lawfulness. 
Thus, the living being is a product of matter and the immaterial. The principle 
of life in an organized being is the principle of immateriality in matter. Kant's Opus 
Postumwn sheds more light on this matter: 
An organic natural body may be thought of as a natural machine (that is to 
say, as a system of externally moving forces, inwardly united into a whole, 
founded upon an idea) in the following way: the organic body is thought of 
as a solid body ... and rigid. The moving forces of matter in such a body 
are either merely vegetative or else vital forces. For the generation of the 
latter, an immaterial principle, possessing an indivisible unity in its power 
of representation, is necessarily required. For the manifold, whose 
combination into unity depends on an idea of a purposively (artificially) 
acting subject, cannot emerge from moving forces of matter (which lack 
the unity of the principle). (OP 22: 547) 
All Organic beings (not mere matter, but bodies) are beings in which there 
is life (immaterial principle, inner final cause). (OP 22:99) 
These are only two passages, among so many, in which Kant confirms the 
immateriality of the principle of life.43 In this way, living beings can be (regulatively 
yet transcendentally) seen from two perspectives: of their matter, and of their living 
character. An organized matter being considered (hypothetically) by itself and without 
a vital force is nothing but a machine; and it is only when it is combined 
(problematically used) with the principle of life that it ascends to the level of a living 
being. About the quality of such a communitl4, Kant is again silent, simply because 
to explain a community that has an immaterial principle on the one side, is beyond the 
43 See for example: OP, 22:4 18; 22:48 1; 22:504; 22:507; 21:210 etc. 
44 Everywhere used problematically. 
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realm of possible experience. I believe this is the true meaning of the inexplicability of 
organized beings: organized beings do not entirely belong to mechanical nature. Now, 
it is wrong to think that DNA can go beyond the whole of material nature and explain 
the immaterial principle of life. The concepts of life and machine are fundamentally 
different, and if they are to be united, it must be done by a unifying element which is 
higher than both of them and can put them together (problematically).45If DNA 
provides a deep mechanical explanation of the genesis of the organized being, that 
explanation, no matter how deep or profound it sounds, cannot explain the capacity to 
originate action from an inner principle; because such a capacity requires freedom and 
purposiveness, both of which coming from, and leading to, contingency. 46 Thus, 
explanations based on the necessary laws of mechanics do not provide the tiniest clue 
even of the meaning of the question of life and freedom (in their metaphysical sense), 
let alone provide an answer to that question. 
Therefore, two realms of mechanics and technique of nature are vividly 
distinguished from one another although being mutually connected. As we have seen 
in previous chapters, without a body, the principle of life (freedom, technicality, soul, 
etc.) cannot originate any motion, because it is only in space and among extended 
substances that motion can take place. And with no living force, no motion can be 
originated, since effective causality of the material world does not explain the 
origination of motion and causal relation. 
45 This is not at all to suggest the theory of "Divine Assistance" as explained in the previous 
chapter. 
46 Kant explains that matter clearly in CPJ, 5:4 11- 13. 
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This is the reason of the peculiarity and inscrutability of organized beings for 
Kant. As Guyer (2005, 342) asserts, Kant's focus on organisms is related to his claim 
that among the proofs to the existence of God "the argument from design must always 
be treated with a kind of respect. .. because it is the clearest and the most appropriate to 
common human reason." In this way, "the experience of organisms would play an 
indispensable role in introducing the teleological perspective to normal human agents" 
(Guyer 2005, 342). 
We, ourselves, are organized beings and (as Kant applies this analogy) we can 
understand the argument by making analogy between the life of organisms and our 
own experience of life. It is by that analogy that Kant moves from the regulative 
principle of purposiveness concerning animals and plants to the immediate 
purposiveness we can find in ourselves as human beings. Then, there is a second move 
from purposiveness, to freedom, morality and from there to God manifested in CPJ 
from §85 to §89. This second move, i.e. to ascend from the organization of organized 
beings to the organization of nature as a whole,47 and also the move to the practical 
realm of human freedom and then to the supersensible highest unity (God), must not 
be neglected. 
What makes such a move possible is life that is the ground of purposiveness 
and self-organization of organized beings as an immaterial principle the very essence 
of which goes beyond the realm of mechanism: 
47 Kant goes even further and takes the whole world as a living organized being: "Life is "[t]he 
productive force in this unity" , and "this vital principle can be applied a priori, from 
consideration of their mutual needs, to plants, to animals, to their relation to one another taken 
as a whole, and finally, to the totality of our world" (OP 21 :2 11 ). 
All matter is lifeless and thus contains no ground of life in it. Life must 
depend upon an immaterial, thinking principle; this principle cannot be 
material, for by the principle of life we always imagine something which 
determines itself from inner grounds. (Lectures on Metaphysics, 28:765) 
Conclusion: 
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We investigated, from different perspectives, the differences between the 
accounts of purposiveness and teleology as stated in the first and the second Critique. 
Internal purposiveness of the organization of organized beings derived from nature 
and the reflecting power of judgment emphasizes the mediatory function between the 
two sides of the gap between experience and reason, freedom and system, teleology 
and mechanism. 
Also, the mechanical inexplicability of organized beings is being described 
due to the formative character of their organization and their community with the 
immaterial principle of life. Living beings are inexplicable because they have the 
capacity to originate action. If it were possible to explain living beings by mechanical 
laws, then they would be nothing but mere machines, bound to the efficient causality 
of nature. 
From the peculiar purposiveness of organized beings and their living character 
we were able to see them as the products of both the mechanism and the technique of 
nature. A living being is at the same time bound to mechanical laws and free from 
them. A living being is a mediator between the material and immaterial, system and 
freedom, supersensible and sensible. The life of living beings is that which manifests 
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the immaterial and free character of them; and their organization manifests their 
lawfulness and systematicity. This is not at all to say that the living being is actually 
divisible into a material and an immaterial part, but it is to say that, a living being is a 
co-product of both. Thus, living beings stand between the sky and the earth, between 
metaphysics and physics. They do not belong solely to either the metaphysics of 
nature, or the metaphysics of morals. Living beings, in this way, belong to a category 
which I would like to call it the metaphysics of life. 
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General Conclusion 
Kant's engagement with the question of life emerges at the very beginning of 
his philosophical career in the Living Forces as the question of motion in matter. 
Kant's New Elucidation as well as his Only Possible Argument shows his close 
concern with that question in the form of the mind-body problem and the possibility of 
community between the two. The immateriality of the principle of life is taken beyond 
refutation as the principle of spontaneous motion, but as we see-the most extensively-
in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, the communion of such a principle with a material 
body allows no explanation within the boundaries of reason. 
Critique of Pure Reason elevates the mind-body problem both psychologically 
and metaphysically. Regarding the former, the mind-body problem manifests itself as 
the problem of the possibility of extended substance in a thinking subject, and thus, 
escalates to an epistemological problem. The problem becomes even more 
complicated once the metaphysical aspect of the mind-body problem develops into the 
problem of the compatibility of systematicity and freedom. If life is the communion of 
the principle of life as the capacity to act on an inner principle, and the organized body 
of a living being shows the most inscrutable systematicity that can be found in nature, 
then, how is it at all possible to explain a living being which manifests the both sides 
of the dichotomy of freedom and system?! The answer to that question is similar in the 
first Critique to the one provided in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: there IS no answer. 
Rather, it is not possible for our limited reason to answer the question. 
Critique of the Power of Judgment is Kant's most extensive attempt to find an 
at least satisfactory solution to the mystery of the organized/living being. He revises 
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his epistemology and teleology fundamentally in order to find a place for the 
organized/living being in his system of philosophy. He makes a great improvement by 
confirming the position of the living being as the mediator between the two sides of 
the dichotomy above: the reflecting power of judgment on the one hand, and the 
peculiar account of natural purposiveness on the other, are the main shaping elements 
of that improvement. 
Does that improvement and revision make the organized/living being any less 
mysterious? Does it provide a final answer to the question of life? Do we know what 
the community of material and immaterial means, or how is/not such a community 
possible? Kant's answer is: 
Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property if one calls it an 
analogue of life: but then one must either endow matter as mere matter 
with a property (hylozoism) that contradicts its essence, or else associate 
with it an alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul), in which 
case, however, if such a product is to be a product of nature, organized 
matter as an instrument of the soul is already presupposed, and thus makes 
that product not the least more comprehensible, or else the soul is made 
into an artificer of this structure, and the product must be withdrawn from 
(corporeal) nature. Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is therefore 
not analogous with any causality that we know. (CPJ, 5:374-5) 
First of all, the distinction between the principle of life and the organization of the 
organized being must not be neglected, because if there is no distinction, then there is 
either no immaterial principle of life, or there is no matter. We have seen in the thesis 
that neither the former nor the latter is possible: matter is by definition lifeless, and 
thus no motion can be originated by matter itself; and with no matter, no motion is 
possible since the soul as anima, taken in isolation as a simple substance, is deprived 
of extension; and with no extension there is no space or connection, thus, motion 
would be meaningless in the lack of matter. 
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Second, although the immaterial principle of life is undeniable in living nature, 
nothing more can be said to explain the quality or the possibility of the community 
between nature as mechanical/material and the immaterial principle of life. Even the 
term community (Gemeinschaft) says too much about what we cannot possibly know 
of, and is being used only problematically. Thus, we have to suffice to get only closer 
to understanding the living being by calling it an analogue of life, because none of the 
explanations of life as the community of soul and body, i.e. of the immaterial principle 
of life and the organic body, are legitimate. The claim of hylozoism is contradictory, 
and spiritual explanations are all beyond the limits of reason. 
I tried in this thesis to show how Kant, perhaps, gets closer to understanding 
the organized being by not losing hope in the immaterial principle of life as the ground 
of freedom. It is only by the immateriality of the principle of life that morality and 
theology are possible: without that principle, the world as a whole would tum into a 
product of a blind mechanism and would lack any principle, entity, or character which 
is not explicable by merely necessary laws of mechanics. Such a view immediately 
eliminates the possibility of freedom and thus annihilates morality and theology. 
Thus, the organized/living being is bound to matter and is free from it at the 
same time. It must be a product of nature and so be bound to the necessary laws of 
mechanics; and at the same time, the contingency of its inner causality manifests the 
presence of a capacity to act on freedom that is only possible if it originated from an 
immaterial principle. In this way, the organized being is the product of both the 
technique and the mechanics of nature. According to the former, it is related to the 
principles of teleology, freedom and art; and concerning the latter, it is bound to the 
necessary laws of matter and motion. This dual character makes the organized/living 
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being a unique candidate to play the mediating role between the supersensible and the 
sensible, metaphysics and physics. 
To the end of Kant's career, the mystery of life remains a mystery, but it finds 
itself a meritorious position in his system of philosophy: the bridge between 
metaphysics and physics. In this way, if the metaphysics of nature is the metaphysics 
of "I think" and the metaphysics of morals is the metaphysics of "I act"; the 
metaphysics of life is the metaphysics of "I live". It is neither about what is nor about 
what ought to be; it happens when what is determines what ought to be. It is neither a 
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